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The study set out to examine the emergence of ethnic militia movements in the oil-rich 
Niger Delta in Nigeria. The most prominent themes that are related to this process are the 
federal structure and the predatory character of the Nigerian state, neo-patrimonial rule in 
the local communities and pervasive economic and social deprivation. Conflict theories 
of Burton, Collier and Hoeffler and Galtung that provide insight in the causes of 
insurgencies were applied on three ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta. These 
are the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw Youth 
Council (lYC) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). In 
testing the explanatory value of each of the theories the question of greed versus 
grievance was addressed. Based on the processes of transformation that each of the three 
militia movements underwent, and what has become clear about the internal structure of 
and methods used by each of them, it appears that grievance nor greed are the principal 
motivations of the rebels. Rather, the dynamics that drive these organisations must be 
sought in the political economy that defines the Niger Delta, the social structures of its 
communities, and the economy of conflict that hinges on organised crime, violence and 
even dialogue. Secondary sources have been used for this study, ranging between 
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Since the late 1990s there has been a phenomenal increase in ethnic militia movements in 
the Niger Delta. They rebel against the federal government and the practices of trans-
national oil companies (TOCs) that operate on their lands. Most of the Niger Delta people 
live in abject poverty, and unemployment rates are high. A multi-million dollar oil 
industry, an authoritarian, often partial government, international networks of organised 
crime and large scale oil theft, proliferation of small arms and environmental degradation 
create the scene for all kinds of violence. The emergence of ethnic militia movements is 
the product of a plethora of causes and enabling factors. Originally an expression of 
discontentment with their marginalised position in the Nigerian polity and the miserable 
conditions in which the oil-producing communities live, the insurgency in the resource-
rich region of Nigeria now appears to have mutated into a new kind of activism. 
All the ethnic militia movements clamour for an end to the environmental spoilage that 
poisons their fishing waters, for more control over their oil revenues and a restructuring 
of the federal system that has enabled the elites to loot their resources and leave the 
region impoverished. Yet, many of the movements are involved in clandestine activities 
such as illegal bunkering, sponsored election violence, kidnapping of TOC staff and 
pipeline vandalisation. The true objectives of some of them may not be the same as the 
reasons why they were originally formed. Also, one organisation could be involved in 
both clandestine and legal activities at the same time, while another never professed 
social objectives to begin with. 
The crisis in the Niger Delta is currently a hot item in international media and politics. 
Two factors in particular have contributed to this fact. Firstly, the kidnapping of 
expatriates by the militias as a means to grab public attention, as well as that of 
international stakeholders in order to indirectly extort adherence of the state, is a rapidly 
expanding practice. Secondly, the strategic importance of Nigerian oil to the global 











makes whatever happens in its main oil-producing region cause ripples with far-reaching 
effect. With the use of modem information technology and mass media, the militia 
movements in the Niger Delta have the proven ability to cause a surge in the price of oil 
in a matter of a day, by simply issuing a statement warning for new attacks or by taking a 
fresh round of hostages. Moreover, an explosion of the Niger Delta crisis has the 
potential of taking the entire Nigerian state with it. 
Nigeria is a country in transition. In 1999 the democratically elected government of 
Olusegun Obasanjo replaced a 30-year long nearly uninterrupted succession of military 
regimes. But the democratic transition has not yet led to an end of the violent identity 
conflicts that pervade the country. Nor has democracy delivered the political and 
economic dividends that most Nigerians were hoping for. A pivotal issue that drives 
continuous political contention in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta is resource distribution. 
Oil being the main source of government revenue, regions and states contend vigorously 
for their share. But the oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, from which the 
gross part of the oil is extracted, feel that they have been structurally neglected and 
deprived of what rightfully belongs to them. 
It would be impossible to examine all the militia movements in the Niger Delta, so a 
selection has been made. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND), the Ijaw Youth Council (lYC) and Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) are the cases under review. The study will be limited to literature 
research. This is mainly due to practical reasons, because for the author of this study there 
is no occasion at present time to conduct interviews in the field. 
Firstly, a number of questions need to be addressed within a theoretical framework. The 
first refers to the evidence. Obviously, the intention of the author of this study is not 
merely to provide a historical account of the circumstances and facts that preceded the 
emergence of the ethnic militia movements. The aim is to investigate which of these 
factors caused the emergence of ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta. This 











presumed result. A test procedure that comes to mind is to examine the statements of the 
leaders of the movements. In many cases the movements have issued official declarations 
to explain their inception. Other sources are media and academic reports and interviews. 
Some leaders are involved in intellectual and scholarly enterprises themselves, and have 
written historical accounts about the nascence and development of their organisations.' 
What factors led to the emergence of the ethnic militia movements? The aim of this study 
is to reveal the social, political and economic dynamics that caused community leaders, 
often youths, to organise and fight for either social change or financial gain, and, in some 
cases, both. The emergence of MOSOP, IYC and MEND is examined and analysed with 
regard to their nature, objectives, methods and structure. The next step is to examine how 
different conflict theories relate to reality as it is found in Nigeria's Niger Delta. 
The theories of Burton, Galtung and Collier and Hoeffier shed light on the causes of 
conflict and rebellion. They do this from very different vantage points. The first-
mentioned focuses on grievances that motivate rebels and their support base, while the 
last-mentioned regards greed as the decisive factor, i.e. the opportunities that are 
perceived to be present for profiting financially from civil war. The proximity of large 
amounts of natural resources plays a significant role in both constructs. The theory of 
Galtung focuses less on motivations than on the structures in which peace and violence 
exist. In his view, a society is a system that functions according to a mechanism of social 
and political interactions. Galtung's view on society and the role that violence plays in it 
is helpful with regard to the analysis of the emergence of the ethnic militia movements in 
the Niger Delta. It is instructive for an examination of their internal structure and the 
networks that interlink them, their relationships with their communities and their position 
in the political/corporate system. 
Needs theory is a collection of ideas. It perceives the basis of conflict and rebellion to be 
unequal distribution of power. Needs that have such weight that individuals are willing to 
1 Oronto Douglas, co-author of Where vultures feast. Shell, human rights, and oil (London, New York: 











fight, even die for them, and that are so basic to existence that all humans share them, are 
regarded as 'basic human needs.' Galtung introduced the notion of 'structural violence', 
which refers to the systematic ways in which a regime can prevent individuals from 
realising their potential. Collier and Hoeffler use a different approach to examine the 
causes of contlict and especially civil war. They focus on quantitative factors that relate 
to opportunity, rather than on social and political motives for starting a rebellion. In 
Chapter 3 these theories are examined at greater length in order to establish the 
explanatory value of each of them. In addition, Chapter 3 presents a discussion of 
analytical perspectives of others like Ikelegbe and Reno, 
To facilitate the understanding of the context within which the Niger Delta militia 
movements mobilised, Chapter 2 presents a description of the political economy of oil in 
the Niger Delta. The emergence of ethnic militia movements and their nature reveal 
aspects of the process of transition that the Nigerian state is going through. Is the 
emergence of the militia movements a feature of this transition and do they augur a 
revolution of social and political justice in Nigeria, or will they merely contribute to the 
collapse of the state into ever smaller power units? In Chapter 4 the emergence of 
MOSOP, IYC and MEND will be reviewed, with special attention to the transformation 
processes of which they were part, and sometimes a catalyst. In addition, in Chapter 4 the 
theoretical frameworks of Chapter 3 will be pieced together with the historical account of 
Chapter 2, and attempt to deliver a conclusion about why the ethnic militia movements 
emerged and what their nascence, dynamics, nature of the struggle and structure can tell 











2. Nigeria: Background and federal structure 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to understand the dynamics that interplay in the Niger Delta in government, civil 
society and social structures the parameters of Nigeria's recent political history will be 
introduced in the following chapter. The outrageous ethnic pluralism of the state and the 
various modes by which lawmakers and constitutionalists have attempted to make it 
viable will be discussed in this chapter as well. The minorities question first came to a 
head when the Biafra war broke out only six years after the birth of the First Republic 
(1960). In more recent times, ethnic mobilisation and the politicisation of ethnicity have 
been common responses to political exclusion and economic hardship in the Niger Delta 
as well as in other parts of Nigeria. But in the Niger Delta state neglect and the structural 
violence that the state has visited on its inhabitants has reinforced the detrimental impact 
of oil extraction on the communities that live in the direct surroundings of its production. 
In the political economy of the Niger Delta the failures of the extracting state are 
particularly obvious. Here oil, profit, crime, exclusivist social structures, political 
machines, environmental degradation and intricate networks of patronage connecting all 
levels of public administration have colluded, making the Niger Delta a place of rampant 
poverty and gross violation of human rights: a fertile soil for a thriving economy of war. 
2.2. The Nigerian post-colonial state 
When Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, its government was structured 
as a federal system based on three states: Eastern, Western and Northern Nigeria. This 
division followed the administrative structure of the former British rule, and reflected the 
'ethnic triumvirate' of the dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria: HausaiFulani in the North, 
Yoruba in the West and Igbo in the East? Although the aim of the tripartite arrangement 
was to accommodate the interests of the diverse ethnic groups and curb rivalry between 
2 International Crisis Group, 'Nigeria: Want in the midst of plenty', Africa Report, No.113 (Dakar/Brussels, 











the three ethnic blocks, it was immediately challenged by the minorities within each state. 
The civilian government was overthrown with a military coup in 1966. Until this day the 
National Question, or 'how to structure the state so that every ethnic or religious group 
and every Nigerian as an individual becomes a stakeholder' has remained a prime 
challenge and focus of Nigerian politics.3 
2.2.1. Politicized ethnicity 
Nigeria counts over 250 ethno-linguistic minorities, and numerous religious communities. 
Nigeria's description as 'merely a geographical expression', coined by Chief Balewa 
Awolowo in 1947, is still fitting today.4 Ethnically, the Middle Belt is the most varied 
region, with more than half of Nigeria'S ethnic groups living there. Some ethnic groups 
comprise just a few thousand members.5 
Ethnic identity is commonly understood to be dynamic. In Nigeria, as in most African 
countries, it exists of 'historical constructions with political value.,6 Osaghae defines 
ethnicity as follows: 'The employment and or mobilisation of ethnic identity or difference 
to gain advantage in situations of competition, contlict or co-operation.' 7 In its politicised 
form, involving mobilization, demands and political action, it has, and continues to 
constitute serious threats to the Nigerian state. In the wake of the detrimental social and 
economic repercussions of economic reforms in the 1980s, ethnicity has resurged as a 
potent force,8 so that currently, '[o]f all the claims that rival those of the state - to 
autonomy, self-determination and loyalty of citizens - none, it can be argued, threatens 
its existence as much as those made by ethnic groups [ .. ].'9 
3 ICG No.113: 2. 
4 lCG No.1 13: I. 
5 T. Lehtinen and N. Ogumbor, 'The mosaique of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria', in T. Kivimaki 
and L. Laakso (eds), Greed, grievance and weak states. Overview of African conflicts (Helsinki: 
Intercontent Books No. II, 2000): 167-170. 
6 1CG No.113: 2. 
7 E.E. Osaghae quoted in c.1. Obi, 'The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria under economic 
adjustment: The case of the oil minorities movement of the Niger Delta', Research Report, No.119 
(Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2001): 12. 
8 M. Doornbos quoted in c.1. Obi, 'The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria': 12. 
9 E.E. Osaghae, 'State, constitutionalism and the management of ethnicity in Africa', Africa and Asian 











Osaghae rightly notes that 'What propels ethnic mobilization is not simply ethnic 
difference, pride or consciousness, but unequal and unjust conditions - discrimination, 
resource and distributional inequality, marked inequalities in opportunity and access -
that produce the kinds of consciousness that would make people take political action.' 10 
Ethnicity and ethnic conflict have infused political competition, class cleavages and 
social agitation throughout Nigeria. 
The main tension in ethnic relations in Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial system 
of indirect rule that gave the bigger groups the advantage. Ethnicity determined to a large 
extent who was entitled to what, and what resources - both benefits and positions in the 
colonial administration - one could strive for. After independence the majority groups 
that had been favoured during colonial rule consolidated their access to and control over 
power and resources. II 
On numerous occaSIOns politicised ethnicity has led to 'anti-system demands' and 
challenged the existence and the legitimacy of the state directly in pursuit of autonomy, 
self-detennination, even secession. 12 The most dramatic instance of this has been the 
Biafra War (1967-70) when Igbos in the Eastern state declared their secession from 
Nigeria. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Hausa, had just eliminated the Igbo 
General John Aguiyi Ironsi's junta with a countercoup in 1966. Undoing Ironsi's 
declaration of Nigeria as a unitary state, Gowon instituted the second federal division of 
the nation by introducing a twelve-state-system; six in the north and six in the south. The 
first of these 'ethnic management interventions' after the birth of the First Republic had 
been the creation of a fourth state in the Middle Belt region in 1963. 
The broad catch-all approach to minority problems of most Nigerian administrations 
between the First Republic (1961) and the Fourth (1999), the de-federal ising 
10 E.E. Osaghae, 'State, constitutionalism and the management of ethnicity in Africa': 99. 
II c.I. Obi, 'The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria': 9. 











consequences of prolonged military rule and the relative neglect of minority issues have 
had a negative impact on the capacity of the state to manage ethnicity effectively. 13 The 
lack of state legitimacy and the perceived partiality of the state have weakened its 
capacity as a mediator. Its approach to ethnic conflict has been generally to suppress all 
organised agitation. 
Generally, ethnic conflict and ethnic tension have manifested themselves in two forms. 
The first is inter- and intra-group conflict, often revolving around uneven distribution of 
resources and opportunities. 14 Inequality has in some cases been grounded in the 
constitution. The 'settler versus natives' dichotomy, which has been most violent in its 
confrontations in the ultra-heterogeneous Middle Belt, has been exacerbated by the 
effects of state multiplication, combined with a certain provision in the 1979 constitution. 
This provision states that 'indigenes' of a state are entitled to access to institutions and 
benefits which 'settlers' are not. In the Niger Delta this dichotomy, which has not been 
removed or adapted in the 1999 Constitution, blended with the struggle for resources and 
benefits, and has led to numerous violent confrontations between and within ethnic 
communities. ls 
In other cases, ethnic tensions have been aggravated by the effects of the distributive 
character of the Nigerian Federation under military rule. Suberu (200 I) observes that in 
Nigeria the federal principle has paradoxically made the central government stronger, 
instead of dividing government power on a territorial basis. Suberu states: 'Federalism in 
Nigeria has been assimilated into a distributive strategy that is designed to channel central 
resources to ethno-territorial or sectional constituencies.' 16 Over-centralisation of the 
Nigerian federation was caused by a number of factors. Suberu mentions the unifying 
13 E.E. Osaghae, 'Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society: The Nigerian experience', 
The journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36,No.1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1998): 2. 
14 E.E. Osaghae, Ethnicity and its management in Africa: The democratization link (Lagos: Malthouse 
Press, 1994): 12. 
15 International Crisis Group, 'Nigeria's faltering federal experiment', Africa Report No.119 (Dakar/ 
Brussels: 25 October, 2006): 11-2. 
16 R.T. Suberu, Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 











impact of the civil war; domination of the Nigerian economy by federally collected oil 
revenues; and the continued intensity of distributive contention, as opposed to productive 
accumulation.,17 The intricacies of the Nigerian federal system will be discussed in 
another section of this chapter. 
2.2.2. Economic decline 
In addition to the appropriation of the state by political elites to serve their own interests, 
and state repression, which reached an apex under the junta of General Sani Abacha 
between 1993 and 1998, Nigerians have suffered immensely under the consequences of 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP was introduced by Abacha's 
predecessor Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who took power in 1983. 
Babangida was supported by the IMF and Worldbank thanks to his liberal economic 
policies. He also introduced a programme for transition to democratic rule. However, this 
programme has come to be known as the 'transition without end' .18 The failure of the 
SAP is closely linked to the increase of ethnic tensions and conflicts in the 1980s and 
1990s. The neglect of agriculture was reinforced by the oil boom in the 1970s and moved 
the Nigerian economy to become a virtual mono-economy by the end of the 1980s. In 
1965, agriculture accounted for 75,9 percent of total federal revenue; in 1980 it had 
declined to 2,4 percent. The oil segment of total federal revenue was 2,7 percent in 1960; 
by 1981 it had grown to 96, I percent. 19 The demise of agriculture meant a loss of 
livelihood for a large section of the Nigerian population. 
Initial economic growth, that marked the 1970s as a result of the seemingly unlimited 
influx of petrodollars in the economy, radically reversed by the end of the 1980s. The oil-
shocks of '77 and '81 had already triggered significant decline, but the real collapse 
ensued in the late 1980s.2o The SAP deepened the economic crisis that it was meant to 
resolve.21 The social costs of the Nigerian SAP have affected rural communities 
17 R.T. Suberu, Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria: 2. 
18 c.1. Obi, 'The changing fonns of identity politics in Nigeria': 60. 
19 C. Ake, Democracy and development in Africa (Washington, D.C : Brookings Institution, 1996): 49. 
20 c.1. Obi, 'The changing fonns of identity politics in Nigeria': 32. 











differently than the urban. Although rural dwellers suffered tremendously from the 
reforms in agricultural policy, the consequences for urbanites were more far-reaching, 
and affected employment, fuel prices, transportation, health, education, interest rates, 
price controls, water and electricity provision, post and telecom services. Because the 
public sector was and remains the largest employer (at least 60 percent), cut-downs of the 
government bureaucracy hit workers hard. It is estimated that between 1984 and 1989 
circa I million people were retrenched from the public sector.22 
The crisis of youth is rooted in the rapid population growth that has gripped Nigeria 
during the last three decades. This demographic change combined with 
'the collapse of the educational system, resulted in the constriction of opportunities in the formal 
job sector and the relegation of most ofthe nation's youth to eking out a harsh existence, either 
from a difficult informal sector or from the nightmare of an over-crowded job market. Under these 
circumstances, increasing numbers of youths, particularly in the nation's major urban centres, have 
been exposed to living on the streets, in "a culture of marginality" that is rooted in drugs, loose 
morality, violence, profanity and disrespect for social institutions.,23 
One of the most profound consequences of these processes was the expansIOn of the 
informal sector. Many people who had jobs adopted 'multiple modes of livelihood', for 
example by starting small-scale agricultural activities. The growth of the informal sector 
increased the level of competition, most notably in trade. 24 It is no coincidence that the 
first vigilante ethnic militia in the eastern Anambra State, was conceived by the Onitsha 
Market Traders Association.25 
Because health care and other social selVlces became unaffordable, people turned to 
themselves in their struggle to make ends meet. The importance of identities of kinship, 
22 E.E. Osaghae, 'Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria', Research Report No.98 (Uppsala: Nordic 
Africa Institute, 1995): 35. 
23 A. Sesay, C. Ukeje, O. Aina, and A. Odebiyi (eds), Ethnic militias and the future of democracy in 
Nigeria (Ile-Ife: Centre for Development and Contlict Management Studies; Obafemi Awolowo University 
Press, 2003): 20-21. 
24 E.E. Osaghae, 'Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria': 35. 
25 J. Harnischfeger, 'The Bakassi Boys: Fighting crime in Nigeria', Journal f!f Modern African Studies, 











ethnicity, etc. increased, and organisations that based their membership profile on these 
identities proliferated.26 
There are two, seemingly contradictory, factors responsible for these phenomenal 
changes in "patterns of social relations": 
I. a shrinking responsibility of the state in the provision of public goods; 
2. an increased involvement of the state in other areas, especially rural development 
and repressing people's opposition to the reforms.27 
In the end, the 'retrenchments, removal of subsidies, rising costs of food and other 
essential goods and services, and other hardships which the SAP wreaked on the people 
were very costly to the government because they led to a massive withdrawal of support, 
replaced by fierce opposition. ,28 
The crisis of youth is seen by Sesay et al. as an important factor in the proliferation of 
'ethnic militias, vigilantes and sundry militant and predominantly youthful groups.' The 
youths, who litter the streets looking for work, or any kind of income generating activity, 
would spontaneously amplify any ethnic conflict incident that occurred, and seize the 
opportunity to loot shops and offices and harass innocent citizens. According to Sesay et 
aI., 'there is no doubt that many of these youths have acquired 'respectability' by 
subsequently becoming full members of ethnic militias or vigilante organizations. ,29 
Also, they have been hired by political and ethnic entrepreneurs to employ thuggish 
activities for the selfish or partisan objectives of their employers.3o 
Decreasing legitimacy of the state plays an important role in its failure to act as a 
mediator in conflicts amongst ethnic groups and between ethnic groups and TOes, which 
is its fundamental responsibility. Parallel to the civil unrest that ensued from worsening 
26 E.E. Osaghae, 'Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria': 36. 
27 E.E. Osaghae, 'Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria': 35. 
28 E.E. Osaghae, 'Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria': 37. 
29 A. Sesay et aI., Ethnic militias and the future of democracy in Nigeria: 21. 











material conditions the character of Babangida's administration became more and more 
repressive. The democratisation programme that had been initiated by the military ruler at 
the outset of his regime remained uncompleted, to the growing frustration of civil society 
organisations. The politics of structural adjustment provoked a transformation of social 
movements that had formerly been oriented more toward strengthening of (ethnic) 
positions within the Nigerian federation, for instance through pressing for new states. 
This change was reflected in the increasing democratic content of the demands of these 
ethnic minority movements. 31 
The culmination of the CIVIC opposition against Babangida was reached with the 
annulment of the 1993 elections and the incarceration of its apparent winner, the Y oruba 
businessman Moshood Abiola. The formation of the first ethnic militant movement in 
Nigeria, the Oodu'a People's Congress (OPC) was the Yoruba's response to this blatant 
disregard of the constitution.32 In the country's south-west, the OPC pressed for Yoruba 
autonomy and an end to corruption. They also demanded the convention of a Sovereign 
National Conference where all ethnic groups would be represented and could discuss a 
radical decentral isation of the Nigerian federal system. 33 
'[E]thnicity emerged as one of the most potent strategies for coping with scarcity and the 
challenge of survival.,34 According to Osaghae, this was probably even more the case for 
the country's privileged classes, which depended on state patronage for their sustenance. 
'The desperate elites (and youths) have pursued largely private interests by organizing 
militant ethnic organisations which ostensibly demand collective material benefits and 
rights.,35 The International Crisis Group (lCG) observes that 'the politicisation of 
ethnicity and religion and factional mobilisation along these same lines is a direct by-
31 c.l. Obi, 'The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria': 56. 
32 O. Agbu, 'Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria' Research report, No.127 
(Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004): 16-17. 
33 W. Reno, 'The politics of violent opposition in collapsing states', Government and Opposition, 
VoI.40,No.2 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 136. 
34 E.E. Osaghae, 'Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society': 15. 











product of the monopolisation of power and assets by ruling elites eager to avoid open 
and fair competition.,36 
2.2.3. Minorities in the Niger Delta 
The failure of the government to curb pogroms on Igbos living in the Northern state and 
the perceived imbalance of power in favour of the North was the major cause for the 
attempted secession and the ensuing Biafra war.37 In the East the Niger Delta 
communities, minorities on both the national and the regional level, pitted themselves 
against the Igbos' cause and sided with the federal government. This 'betrayal', as it was 
regarded by the Igbos, is explained by the Delta minorities' fears of living in an 
autonomous, Igbo-dominated Biafra. If the discrimination and intimidation that was 
experienced by the Ijaws, Itsekiris, Etches, Ibibios, Ekwerres, Urhobos and Ogoni of the 
Niger Delta is studied on a day to day basis, it is clear that this fear was not 
unreasonable.38 As with the Middle Belters, the Nigerian government offered the Niger 
Delta minorities a measure of self-rule in return for their support of the federal cause. 
Two new states, Rivers and South East State, were carved out for them. Until today the 
'sell-out' of the Niger Delta has fostered resentment between the Igbos and their 
neighbours in the eastern part of the country.39 After the civil war that claimed between 
one and two million lives ended in 1970 with the surrender of the Biafrans a period of 
boundless optimism ensued. General Gowon delivered his famous "no victors, no 
vanquished" speech on national radio and granted amnesty to all but the most important 
leaders of the rebellion. The explosive rise of the oil price on the world market coincided 
with the end of the civil war. 
36 leG No.1 13: Executive Summary. 
37 leG No.II3: 7. 
38 V.A. Isumonah, 'The making of the Ogoni ethnic group', Africa, Vol. 74,No.3 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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2.3. Predatory rule, neo-patrimonialism and oil 
Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and commercial exports started two years later.40 
In 1970 oil revenue was still at a modest $250 million dollars. Three years later the oil 
boom that followed the OPEC embargo and the Yom Kippur war raised this number to 
$2.1 billion in 1972 and a dazzling $11.2 billion in 1974.41 Financial constraints vanished 
almost overnight. The oil wealth however produced rampant corruption. In 1969 the 
Petroleum Decree vested the entire ownership of "all oil and gas within any land in 
Nigeria, as well as under its territorial waters and continental shelf' with the federal 
government. In 1971 the government nationalized the oil industry by establishing the 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC). The NNOC has since then held a majority 
share in all joint ventures with trans-national oil companies (TOCs) that exploit the 
country's oil fields.42 
The bulk of Nigeria's oil is located in the Niger Delta. Aside from oil, Nigeria has proven 
gas reserves that make it the seventh largest source of gas in the world, but exploitation of 
these resources is still in its early phase.43 Nigerian oil exports today account for 80 
percent of government revenue, 95 percent of export earnings and 40 percent of GOP. As 
mentioned before, the mono-commodity economy has had a detrimental effect on other 
domestic industries, most notably the agricultural sector.44 
The political effect of the oil-centred economy has been, if possible, even more 
detrimental. The perversion of the federal system by successive military regimes to 
advance wealth accumulation for the sole benefit of a political elite has been described 
and decried in numerous accounts.45 The northern hegemony that characterised the 
successive military regimes since the civil war utilised the authoritarianism inherent in 
military rule to appropriate the Niger Delta oil through 'an intense centralisation and 
4° ICGNo.113: 19. 
41 ICG No.113: 7. 
42 ICG No.1 13: 19. 
43 ICGNo.113: 19. 
44ICGNo.113: 19. 
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concentration of power and resources in the federal government. ,46 Although billions of 
oil-dollars flowed into the country between 1970 and the present, the gross part of the 
population has not benefited from this wealth.47 The Niger Delta minorities have 
persistently clamoured to regain control of their natural resources, or at least a larger 
share of oil revenue. The principle of derivation has been an important basis for the 
allocation of government revenue. It allocates revenue on the basis of where it was 
derived from. In 1954 it was 100 percent, today it stands at 13 percent. 
The predatory nature of the Nigerian state, embodied by a hegemonic, over-centralised, 
authoritarian regime, made it an effective instrument of wealth accumulation for a small 
political elite. The structure of this system of predation was institutionalised through a 
network of patrimonial and c1ientelist allegiances running from the top regions of 
government to the state and local, formal and informal, administrative units. The system 
of patronage and neo-patrimonial structures that characterises the Nigerian socio-political 
order is by no means unique. In fact, the regimes of '[m]any developing countries [ ... ] 
beneath the trappings of formal bureaucracy, procedural rules, and law, [their regimes] 
are based upon networks of personal loyalty and patron-client ties.,48 According to 
Lewis, by the beginning of Babangida's rule the Nigerian state had become, a 'prebendal 
order. ,49 The features of this prebendal order are: I) widespread appropriation of public 
resources for private gain; 2) these allocations patterned by ethnically-delineated patron-
client networks; 3) a distributive arena with a largely centralised structure. 50 Babangida is 
said to have fostered a radical change in this prebendal order, which led to the emergence 
of 'predatory rule' in Nigeria from the beginning of the 1990s. The predatory order had 
the following features: I) concentration of personal power under coercive auspices; 2) 
46 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of contlict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria' , Nordic Journal of 
African Studies, VoI.l4,No.2 (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2005): 214. 
47 c.1. Obi, The oil paradox: Reflections on the violent dynamics of petro-politics and (mis)governance in 
Nigeria's Niger Delta (Pretoria: Africa Institute, 2004): 7. 
48 P. Lewis, 'From prebendalism to predation: The political economy of decline in Nigeria', The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, VoI.34,No.1 (Cambridge: University Press, 1996): 99. 
49 P. Lewis, 'From prebendal ism to predation': 80. 











repreSSIOn augmented by material inducement; 3) conscious erosion of central public 
institutions.51 
Eberlein argues that the drive from neo-patrimonial to predatory rule has recently taken a 
twist to localisation. With regard to the crisis in the Niger Delta, he claims that, rather 
than constructing it as an example of 'state failure', the establishment of extra-state 
political formations that preceded it should be seen as a more significant factor. 52 The 
fragmentation of neo-patrimonial models of governance is seen throughout West Africa. 
It leads to a decentralisation (localisation) of power through the authority of traditional 
rulers who base their authority on customary law and informal state patronage, and state 
officials, who operate in the grey area of formal state authority and personal patronage 
ties. Eberlein: '[E]xtreme social exclusion, political ostracism and a profound crisis of 
gerontocratic rule are common to many violent contlicts.'53 
2.3.1. The power of the chiefs 
The situation in the Niger Delta is exemplary with regard to the above-described process. 
Since the colonial era, traditional rulers, their powers based in customary law, have been 
seen as members of a privileged class that were not adverse to cooperating with the 
colonial or the post-colonial authorities. Under colonial rule the Chief was the pillar of 
the system of Native Authority. Indirect rule, which was the system implemented by the 
British to administer most of their African colonies, has been described by Mamdani as 
'decentralized despotism.' Describing the extent of the powers that the legal pluralism of 
colonial Nigeria allowed the chiefs to exercise over their subjects, Mamdani quotes 
Padmore: 'The chief is the law, subject to only one higher authority, the white official 
stationed in his state as advisor. The chief hires his own police ... he is often the 
51 P. Lewis, 'From prebendal ism to predation': 100-\' 
52 R. Eberlein, 'On the road to the state's perdition? Authority and sovereignty in the Niger Delta, Nigeria', 
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prosecutor and the judge combined and he employs the jailer to hold his victims In 
custody at his pleasure. [ ... ],54 
Under colonial rule, the traditional power structures of the Delta chiefs and kings 
remained largely intact, and the British paid a type of 'homage' to traditional rulers. After 
independence, this system has become less clearly defined, although '[c]hiefs and kings 
have continued to receive statutory government allocations -"corney" in a new form -
and, with the growth of the oil industry, have demanded that companies make customary 
payments for land use.'55 Much of the formal political power of the Niger Delta chiefs 
was diminished, but they continued to wield informal power. Local government reforms 
and decrees such as the Land Use Act (1978) further reduced the influence of the chiefs. 
The Land Use Act is said to have 'reduced the interests of individuals and communities to 
"mere rights of occupancy." These rights could be summarily revoked for "over-riding 
public interest", including development of oil installations and pipelines. ,56 
Although the power of the chiefs has certainly been curbed under the reality of the post-
colonial state, in the poor, neglected, remote, mostly rural communities where most 
Nigerians continue to live, the abolition of the colonial state structure meant no radical 
empowerment of the former 'subjects' of the Nigerian colony. In general, the formal 
patronage of the chiefs was morphed to integrate into the emerging hierarchy of 
patronage and neo-patrimonial power structures described earlier. In the Niger Delta, the 
gerontocratic class of traditional rulers were often co-opted by the petro-military alliance, 
taking in their share of the top-down allocations of finance. 57 The mid-1980s brought 
mass mobilisation against the unaccountable rule and social exclusion of the ruling 
gerontocracy.58 
54 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Princeton: 
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2.3.2. Democratic transition 
Even after the democratic elections following the sudden death of General Abacha and 
the instalment of an elected civilian government headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo, 
Nigeria has not yet become a democracy with a credible electoral process.59 Due to the 
serious irregularities that accompanied the elections in 1999 and again in 2003, a large 
proportion of the population still feels disenfranchised and ill- represented in the federal 
government and by their state and local representatives. Ake points out that the 
democratic dividends that Nigerians are yearning for are not in the first place the abstract 
political rights that, though marked with flawed processes, have been won by the 
transition to democratic rule in 1999. They are rather the concrete social, economic, 
cultural and citizenship rights that Nigerians want and need, and from this perspective 
true democracy is inextricably linked to development.6o 
2.4. Federalism 
Nigerian federalism has a number of features that make it perhaps not umque, but 
certainly characteristic of what is seen as the country's perpetual state of collapse. The 
federal structure, which was originally designed as a system to manage the ethnic, 
regional and religious differences in the country, became a contradiction in itself when it 
was seized by military rulers.61 The Federal Character Principle constitutes the way in 
which the Nigerian state, at least in theory, has attempted to manage ethnic contlict. Since 
1979, the Principle has been enshrined in all Nigerian constitutions. It requires that 
'appointments to, and composition of government offices should retlect the kaleidoscope 
of the country's cleavages to prevent the domination of government by people from one 
or a few groups or states.' It thus aims to distribute all posts in the public service of the 
Federation and its 36 states, the Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police Force and other 
59ICGNo.113: 14-5. 
60 D. Abubakar, 'Ethnic identity, democratization, and the'; future of the African state: lessons from Nigeria', 
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government security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the states 
between the different groupS.62 
Another distinctive management mechanism that has been exploited and depleted by the 
military rulers is the boundless multiplication of states from a mere, and, arguably too 
few, three at its independence, to thirty-six at the present. In 1976 the twelve states that 
had been created by Gowon ten years earlier were raised to nineteen, in 1987 to twenty-
one, and in 1991 to thirty. The last wave of six was added by General Abacha in 1996.63 
The creation of more states, which was usually welcomed by the ethnic minorities as a 
measure of decentralization that could promote autonomy for state and local 
governments, effectually enabled the military rulers to consolidate their power through a 
network ofpatronage.64 The proliferation of state structures has diluted power on the state 
level and worked to the advantage of the federal government to exert its will through 
military appointments and authoritarian decision-making.65 
Much in line with the original purpose of the administrative structure of the Nigerian 
agglomeration under colonial rule, the Nigerian federal system has mainly facilitated the 
extraction of domestic surpluses to service the needs of the centre.66 The most striking 
feature of the Nigerian federation is its oil-centric distributive character. The relentless 
struggle of Nigeria's multi-level governments for the centre's financial resources has 
rendered the federal character to become a 'distributive strategy that is designed to 
channel resources to ethno-territorial or sectional constituencies.67 Suberu describes this 
as 'Nigeria's basic political pathology,68 He makes evident how in Nigeria the federal 
62 J.N. Paden, 'Unity with diversity: Toward democratic federalism': 27 in R.t Rotberg (ed.), Crafiing the 
new Nigeria. Confronting the challenges (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
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principle makes the central state stronger, instead of what it ought to do: delegate and 
divide the powers of government.69 The Federation Account is the common national pool 
of oil revenues. It feeds an average of 80 percent of the federal, state and local 
governments' budget.7o Because the state is funded almost entirely by oil revenue, and 
because of the anti-democratic nature of the major part of Nigeria's political history, at 
each level of the state 'the hierarchy of command [has been] shadowed by a hierarchy of 
entitlement.,71 Suberu quotes Ake on this matter: 
'[T]he habit of consuming ... without producing ... underlies our fanatical zeal for political power, 
and our political fragmentation. We seek political power avidly because it enables us to 
accumulate wealth without the bother of producing. We demand more and more states and local 
government areas because as each group divides itself, it appropriates more from the public 
coffers. [ ... ] Our predatory disposition has ... ruined our state-building project. For us the state is 
not so much the incarnation of a corporate political identity as a battlefield. It is an area where the 
different groups go, armed to the teeth, to battle for appropriation of what should be 
commonwealth. Every one takes from it, or tries to, and few ever give. [ ... ] where does the wealth 
which we are for ever scheming to appropriate come from? We do not want to know. All we want 
to know is whether we can muster the power to appropriate it.' 72 
The revenue allocation formula has been revised numerous times between 1960 and 
2000. The derivation principle guaranteed a 50 percent cut of oil revenue to the oil-
producing states under the 1960 and 1963 constitutions. The 1999 constitution set the 
revenue sharing formula at 13 percent.73 That is nowhere near the original level at the 
birth of the First Republic, but it is more than the all-time lows of 1,5 and 3 percent that it 
reached in the 1990s.74 In March 2006, the Joint Constitutional Review Committee made 
a proposal for an increase of the derivation principle to 18 percent for the oil-producing 
states. Most representatives of the oil-bearing communities claim that no less than 20 or 
25 percent is fair. 75 
69 R.T. Suberu, Federalism and ethnic cotiflict in Nigeria: 16. 
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Because the power structure of the state is enmeshed in an intricate network of patronage, 
linking it to the most isolated villages, it is strong when it comes to transmission of 
resources, power and benefits towards the centre. However, the fragmentation of the 
administrative system makes it extremely inefficient. Delivery of public services and 
goods remains abominable. The growth of state-level structures has more negative 
consequences. It has led to 'over-expenditure of state revenue, administrative rivalry and 
obstacles to local private enterprise.' Moreover, the proliferation of minorities has been a 
detrimental effect of the multiplication of states, as each new state meant an opportunity 
for another group to become dominant, and, subsequently, the emergence of new 
'minority' groups on the state level. 
2.5. Political economy of the Niger Delta 
Before embarking on an analysis of the Niger Delta conflict system, it is worthwhile to 
establish to what extent and in which respects the antagonisms are ethnic in their nature. 
The violent confrontations between communities on the local level over resources and 
administrative units can be seen as ethnic conflicts because they are the result of the 
marginalisation of ethnic minorities in Nigerian politics and the socio-economic 
deprivation and inequity that is entrenched in the practice, if not the letter of the 
constitution. The political economy of the Niger Delta is not driven by ethnicity, but the 
political structure of which the region's mineral resources are the cement, the financial 
transactions that it produces, the pyramid of patronage that it supports and the system of 
deprivation and exclusion that it feeds are lined with the fabric that is ethnicity. Ethnicity 
underpins the power structures of the Niger Delta political economy, but it is supported 
by other factors. Some of these are: 
a) The Nigerian federal system and specifically its resource allocation formula; 
b) The detrimental effect of the oil industry on the Niger Delta ecological environment; 
c) Small arms proliferation; 
d) Organised crime and international oil bunkering networks; 











g) A political process that is marked by patronage, patrimonialism and 'the struggle by 
rulers, counter elites and merchants for access to [ .. ] resources for accumulation [ .. ],76; 
h) The strategic importance of Nigerian oil for the global, especially the US, energy 
market; 
i) Incentives and opportunities for predation; 
j) The collusion of the state with private interests, namely the trans-national oil 
companies (TOes) active in the region. 
All the above factors reflect the particular form of state collapse77 that has haunted the 
Nigerian polity for the last few decades, especially since the mid-eighties. In the political, 
social and economic space that was left open due to this state failure, militant ethnic 
movements assumed the role of providing public goods, security, and other basic human 
needs that are essential to human survival.78 In the next chapter the notion of basic human 
needs and its relation to the emergence of ethnic militia movements will be further 
explored. The following two chapters will address the issues of motivations, social 
grievances and causality with regard to the agitations of largely ethnic militia movements. 
Ethnic conflict will serve as a prism to introduce the Niger Delta conflict system, not to 
simplify or reduce it to a single cause, but to emphasise the pervasiveness of ethnicity, in 
both the negative and the positive sense, at all levels and dimensions of Nigerian politics. 
The Niger Delta is a complex production system in which political elites and business 
entrepreneurs have made and continue to make immense profits from the region's 
mineral resources. In the course of this extraction they have, in collusion with a steady 
succession of predatory authoritarian regimes, engaged with the local population In a 
fashion that can be determined as both physically and structurally violent.79 
76 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria': 209. 
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2.5.1. Violence and resistance 
Structural violence in the Niger Delta context has multiple dimensions, but the most 
pervasive of these is probably the socio-economic injustice inflicted on the oil-producing 
communities. Nearly fifty decades of commercial oil exploitation, under the auspices of 
authoritarian governments that were generally unconcerned with putting anything back 
into the region from which it extracted most of its revenue, in the form of infrastructure, 
amenities, or institutions, has left property and land rights obliterated and the natural 
environment severely damaged. Economic activities such as fishing and farming continue 
to deliver receding yields. The local population's dissatisfaction with their situation has 
been expressed in public protest, official appeals to the government, legal action, and 
violent resistance. 
The first armed rebellion against the Nigerian post-colonial state was the Ijaw uprising 
led by Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966. His proclamation of the Ijaw nation preceded the Biafra 
secession attempt by a year but contrary to what happened in Biafra, the Ijaw insurgency 
was quelled within twelve days and its leaders promptly convicted oftreason.8o However, 
the legacy of Boro's rebellion would prove to have a sustained impact and it is perceived 
to be the 'forerunner to the resurgent riverine nationalism.'81 Others have gone even 
further back in history to trace the staunch obstinacy of the Niger Delta peoples.82 
The Niger Delta regIon was one of the first places where intensive trade between 
European merchants and African rulers took place. The coastal kingdoms, located in what 
are now Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States, enjoy the advantage of holding the threshold to 
all the riches that lay in the hinterland. To gain access to the slaves and palm-oil that the 
European merchants were interested in, they had to bargain with the rulers of the coastal 
nations. These rulers engaged with their foreign counterparts on an equal footage, and 
they had no scruples against jailing anyone who disobeyed their rule or disrespected a 
contract. Nor were they hesitant to play one trading company off against another in order 
80 O. Agbu, 'Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria': 29. 
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to get the best deal and maintain dominance in the transatlantic trade.83 Obi traces the 
roots of the Niger Delta political economy to this historical context, where some 
minorities became extremely influential. Ethnic groups like the Itsekiri, Ijaw, and Efik 
were able to extend and consolidate their commercial and social links 'with which they 
were able to dominate their neighbours, especially those in the hinterland.,84 
Militant agitation against the state and the Toes in the Niger Delta reached another 
pivotal moment when a group of Ogoni community leaders and intellectuals founded the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990. Even though 
MOSOP has from the start professed a non-violent approach to obtain a fair share of oil 
revenue, an end to environmental pollution and a degree of local autonomy, as declared 
in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the movement became internally divided and some factions 
displayed increasing militancy.85 The violent response of the Nigerian government to the 
demands of organisations like MOSOP has contributed to a transformation of the 
struggle. Obi states that as a result of state patronage and state repression, the drying up 
of international support for human rights, environmental activism and new opportunities 
brought about by the return to democratic rule, 'certain factions of the movements have 
been drawn into the circuits ofviolence[ .. ].,86 
The MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his consorts were executed after a 
kangaroo tribunal in 1995. But the MOSOP legacy was set, showing that 'a well-
organised civil society group can press for change.'87 One significant strategic move of 
MOSOP in their struggle has been the co-opting of international environmental 
organisations and the generation of international publicity for their cause. Since Shell was 
83 leG No.IIS (3 August, 2006): 2-3; W. Reno, Nigeria afier militQly rule: Federalism, resource 
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forced to close down production in Ogoniland in 1993 due to 'intimidation of its staff'88, 
it has not resumed its activities in the area. 
In the wake of MOSOP, the Ijaw Youth Council (lYC) pitched its own campaign against 
state repression, abuse and neglect of its lands and people. In 1998, some Ijaw youths 
who had departed from, but were still supported by certain elites of the mainstream Ijaw 
National Congress (INC), convened in Kaiama, the birth town of Isaac Adaka Boro, and 
drew up the Kaiama Declaration. They demanded that all oil multinationals should leave 
the Niger Delta until they had obtained a satisfactory degree of resource control through a 
sound democratic process. They denounced the acts and laws that had lended legitimacy 
to the structural robbing of their land and property by TOCs and the government. 
Moreover, they demanded immediate withdrawal of all military forces from Ijawland.89 
The transitional government of General Abdusalami Abubakar responded with a military 
crackdown on all major Ijaw towns and villages. Kaiama was sacked, villages were 
torched and thousands of lives were lost. After Nigeria's return to democracy Ijawland, 
and indeed much of the Niger Delta region, has remained a militarised zone. Violent 
military interventions have continued to mark the history of its communities from the 
sacking of Umuechem in 1990, the destruction of Odi in 1999 and the recent attack on 
Odioma in 2005.90 These crackdowns have usually included lethal shootings, rape and 
mutilation of innocent civilians and destruction and seizure of property. 
The proliferation of ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta since the 1990s has led 
to a current array that is, in the words of Agbu, 'simply mind-boggling'. They include: 
the Ethnic Minorities Organization of Nigeria (EMIRON), National Youth Council of the 
Ogoni People (NYCOP), Ijaw Youth Council (lYC), Movement for the Survival of the 
Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSEIND), Movement for the Survival of 
the Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Isoko National Youth Movement (INYM), 
88 ICG No.IIS: 5. 
89 C.L Obi, The oil paradox: 23. 











Urhobo Youth Movement (UYOMO), Egi Youth Federation (EYF), The Federated Niger 
Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDlC), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Ikwere Youth 
Movement (lYM) and Bayelsa Youths Federation of Nigeria (BYFN).91 
The youth has been the vanguard of this resistance, but women, religious, environmental 
and other groups have been highly active as well, and at times yielded impressive 
results.92 
Youth activism has been directed against the federal government and TOCs, but the 
object of their anger has also been the gerontocratic rule of their traditional leaders. By 
the mid-1980s authority began to make a shift from the chiefs to restive youths who were 
no longer willing to wait patiently for 'their turn' at a grab of power and rent. '[The] rule 
by chiefs and their houses legitimised by age, family history and settler status,' was 
unaccountable and nurtured social exclusion. Many chiefs were seen to have colluded 
with the TOCs, and elders were increasingly shunned when making their plans of action. 
The consequences of youth empowerment in the contlict dynamics of the Niger Delta 
cannot be overstated. Disgruntled youths organized alternative power structures, enabling 
them to circumvent the involvement of their chiefs in negotiating with and applying 
pressure on TOCs and governments.93 According to Obi, the '(inter-generational) 
interrogation of traditional authority by the youth' is a pervasive reality in most oil-
bearing communities.94 However, the reality is that often the collaboration between the 
chiefs and the TOCs was simply replaced by equally usurping liaisons between youth 
groups and TOCs. Some of these groups engaged in violent confrontations with each 
other over the right to cash in on keeping relations with the local TOC good. Often, TOCs 
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had several competing youth organisations on their payroll, in addition to keeping the 
bonds with elders and chiefs alive.95 
The variety of social protest movements and struggles in the Niger Delta that make up the 
political economy of contlict is dumbfounding. The dynamics of a changing political 
environment, coupled with a rising of the stakes -violence, petrodollars, political power-
has transformed the struggle to fit, in part, a 'looting model.,96 However, it would be too 
simplistic to regard the Niger Delta struggles as merely revolving around oil profits. 
Reno demonstrates that the transformation of civil society movements in Nigeria to 
reveal more militant and violent inclinations was partly driven by General Abacha's 
short-term security strategy to aggravate and exploit contlicts within the army and special 
paramilitary units. Both Abacha and his predecessor Babangida formed 'private armies 
for their self-succession bids.'97 In lieu of this strategy, local and state-level military 
factions were supplied with arms, military expertise and disproportionate power to keep 
each other in check, and not pose a threat to the central command.98 The long-term 
impact of this strategy has been the proliferation of arms in the region after the civilian 
government took over power in 1999 followed by the demobilization of paramilitary and 
security forces. Another important cause of the proliferation of arms in the Niger Delta, 
and more generally in Nigeria, is the active involvement of Nigerian troops in peace 
operations in West Africa, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 
2000. Demobilized Nigerian soldiers that had served in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) returned with their weapons, which they either sold, or kept for their own 
use. A great number of these demobilized soldiers would be absorbed in vigilante and 
militant organisations across the country.99 
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Another development after the demise of military rule has been the privatisation of 
security and the decentralisation of violence, as described by Eberlein. loo As a 
consequence of the new democratic rule, argues Eberlein, oil companies had to look for 
new ways to provide their own minimal security, 'in order to continue production in an 
environment of poverty, social exclusion and open hostility.' National police and army 
were no longer the 'sole security sub-contractors ofMNOCs.' 101 
The utilisation of private armies by local and state political elites to compete for political 
power has become increasingly popular in the 1990s.102 Several state governors, for 
whom the eastern Anambra State Chimaroke Mbadinuju led the example with his 
vigilante Bakassi Boys, co-opted these contingents of unemployed' Area Boys' to secure 
their political consolidation. This strategy gained a new dimension when the return to 
civilian rule and the 2003 elections heralded the relative obsoleteness of patronage 
networks that had existed under military rule. 103 
In the Niger Delta, a similar phenomenon occurred in Rivers where the state governor 
Peter Odili allegedly forged an alliance with the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari. Asari is claimed to have provided 
muscle for the governor's 2003 re-election, but their relationship soured after the NDPVF 
clashed with security forces and other militias, such as Ateke Tom's Niger Delta 
Vigilantes (NOV), who were reportedly supported by the 'machiavellic governor.' 104 
After mutual raids between security forces, the NDPVF and the NOV, the NDPVF 
declared all-out war on the Nigerian state. 105 ICG reports that: 
'From mid-2003 to late 2004, Asari and Ateke Tom engaged in a turf war that killed hundreds and 
left tens of thousands homeless. The sizeable, centuries-old towns of Buguma, Bukuma and 
Tombia were badly damaged and areas of the Rivers capital Port Harcourt also razed. Some 
residents have alleged that the fighting centred around control of areas noted for their oil theft. The 
100 R. Eberlein, 'On the road to the state's perdition?': 581,583-4. 
101 R. Eberlein, 'On the road to the state's perdition?': 581. 
102 W. Reno, 'The politics of violent opposition in collapsing states': 140. 
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contlict also allegedly revolved around competing bids for control of tribal chieftaincy titles in 
Buguma and Okrika and other positions with access to government and company oil revenues.'l06 
In 2005 Asari was arrested and remains in jail until this day. 
2.5.2. Resistance, civil war or ethnic conflict? 
From the previous it becomes clear that there is a vast variety of struggles going on in the 
Niger Delta. Obi divides these into four levels: 
• State-oil multinational alliances versus the oil-producing communities; 
• Inter-community struggles; 
• Intra-community struggles; 
• Struggles involving social movements. 107 
Although all these struggles are in origin about 'power and the quest for democracy', oil 
complicates them and has raised the stakes significantly, fuelling violence. 108 It appears 
futile to make a clear-cut distinction between organizations that engage in militant or 
non-violent protest to obtain social change and others that are involved in criminal and 
sometimes terrorist actions. The boundaries between these organizations are said to be 
'blurred and fluid.' 109 
Ikelegbe describes how a regIme of violence has pervaded the Niger Delta. llo The 
Nigerian Armed Forces, 'community, ethnic and youth militias, armed gangs and 
networks, pirates, cultists and robbers' III are the institutions that maintain this regime. 
Aside from the sponsorship of local political elites to consolidate their power and 
manipulate elections, and inter-communal struggles for administrative units that offers 
access to state revenue, there are two dimensions of the Niger Delta 'conflict economy' 112 
106 leG No.118: 4. 
107 c.1. Obi, The oil paradox: 2J. 
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that have impacted the criminal, and some say terrorist, character of the region's 
rebellion. The persistent kidnapping of expatriate oil employees for ransom or socio-
economic benefits on the one hand and illegal bunkering on the other have broadened the 
scene on which the Niger Delta conflict dynamics are played out. 
The amounts of oil that are siphoned off on a daily basis and the equipment that is 
required to transport the spoils out of the country reveal that those who are involved in 
illegal bunkering are highly placed and well-connected."3 The Nigerian Economic 
Summit Group estimates that on average circa 100,000 barrels of Nigerian oil, valued at 
about $2.8 million, are stolen per day."4 The oil-bunkering industry functions much the 
same as the illegal trading in diamonds did in Sierra Leone and Liberia's wars ll5 , and the 
international drug trade that fuels the violence in Columbia, with one significant 
difference.' '6 Whilst drugs and diamonds are relatively easily tucked away in baggage or 
containers, the transportation of oil in slow-moving barges and ships is very difficult to 
hide. A sophisticated security and transportation infrastructure are required to collect, 
transport and sell large quantities of oil. Moreover, to load the stolen oil on barges and 
tugboats and transport it over the rivers and creeks that scar the Niger Delta landscape -
sometimes in broad daylight- to tanker ships for resale to regional refineries and as far as 
South America, Europe and Asia, the complicity, or at least a deliberate ignorance of 
local and foreign officials, border and port patrols is essential."7 
The end of military rule heralded a transformation of the relationship between local 
communities and the oil companies. TOCs saw a greater need to invest in corporate social 
interventions, one of the consequences of which was the rise of community liaison 
113 ICG No.118: 8. Noted is that: 'In 2002, a report by Nigerian security forces, government officials and 
multinational oil company executives, spoke ofa "cartel or mafia" of "highly placed and powerful 
individuals [who] run a network of agents to steal crude oil and finished products from pipelines in the 
Niger Delta region. They operate in similar fashion to drug barons and their activities are purely criminal, 
with financial benefits as their motive ... The activities of these cartels have become a serious threat to the 
economy of the nation.'; A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria': 221-4,227-8. 
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officers. The enormous increase of expenditure of TOCs on community development and 
scholarships for secondary and tertiary education was another effect. 1 18 Perhaps the main 
consequence of the end of the military security regime was the policy ofTOCs to sponsor 
ethnic militia movements to secure their protection and the sustenance of their operations. 
The close relation between the security needs of TOCs and the formation of militant 
youth groups in the Niger Delta has been argued by Kemedi, among others. 1 19 One effect 
of this close relationship was described in an internal report for the Shell Petroleum and 
Development Company in 2004 as follows: '[A]t times oil companies seek or receive 
protection from [armed ethnic militias and warlords] reinforce their financial base and as 
a consequence enable them to buy more arms.' 120 In the following chapter, the dynamic 
relation between predation and rebels' social agendas is addressed. 
One group that has emerged recently in the wake of the NDPYF' demise and with strong 
links to the IYC is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).121 
Since January 2006 the organisation has been involved in violent clashes with state 
security forces, hostage-taking of expatriate oil company employees and the destruction 
of oil installations and even two car bombings.122 However, it is inappropriate to regard 
MEND as a straightforward terrorist organisation. According to Okonta, MEND is 
internally fragmented, with radical elements that are responsible for the violent attacks. 123 
In Chapter 4 the activities and origins of MEND will be examined. For now it is 
sufficient to mention that MEND has heralded a new phase in the Niger Delta rebellion. 
Although its leadership and support are largely Ijaw, it professes a pan-ethnic cause 124, 
with the intellectual sophistication of MOSOP and the fire-power of the NDPVF, it has 
managed to attract the attention of the national as well as international press, and it was 
118 R. Eberlein, 'On the road to the state's perdition?': 583. 
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invited to take part in a conference of dialogue with the federal government to come 
closer to resolving the contlict in April 2006. 125 Unfortunately, the dialogue got stuck in 
its first rounds. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The political and social context in which ethnic militia movements have emerged in the 
Niger Delta is complex, as may be expected. On the basis of ethnic and regional claims, 
minorities clamour for resource control and self-determination. The Nigerian state is, 
even after a democratic transition, ill equipped to deal with the challenges that are posed 
by its internal malcontents. In the Niger Delta, where a political economy evolves 
through informal structures of political patronage and neo-patrimonial rule, clandestine 
and official oil transactions and deep-rooted social, political and economic grievances, 
violence is just another political, and sometimes economic, currency. But what does the 
predatory nature of its surroundings say about the ethnic militia movements that operate 
in the region? Are they to such extent enmeshed in the system in which they must operate 
that they can no longer be regarded as genuine social movements? Taking in account that 
most, if not all the movements of our focus have come to existence in a predatory system 
it is legitimate to question what factors and motivations caused them to emerge. 












3. Greed, grievance and structural violence. 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter a number of analytical perspectives on the causality of rebel movements 
and civil war will be introduced. The pivotal debate in this chapter refers to the greed 
versus grievance theory, the former propagated by Collier and Hoeffler and the latter by 
John Burton - among many others. While Collier and Hoeffler place heavy emphasis on 
the nexus between resources, revenues and civil war, their opponents, who propagate the 
grievance view, argue that while resources might be a factor in --ethnic- conflict, root 
causes of insurgencies and civil wars are more likely to be social and political. The 
question whether rebel movements and civil wars in resource-rich areas generally emerge 
and are motivated by economic incentives to make profit, i.e. greed, or by social 
grievances has shown a tendency to be oversimplified. The analytical perspectives of 
Johan Galtung on structural violence and, less thoroughly discussed, the looting models 
of Ikelegbe and Reno will enhance an understanding of the nature and the dynamics of 
the system in which the ethnic militia movements operate, and the impact these mayor 
may not have on the processes of transformation that they are subjected to.126 
116 One initial point should be made here. With regard to the Niger Delta, there is no agreement about 
whether the agitation embroiling the region can in fact be dubbed a rebellion or a civil war. Certain factions 
have declared war against the Nigerian government, and several announcements of secession have been 
made. But the response of the government has always been to take away the impression that anything more 
than a problem oflaw and order is at hand. The rebel movements involved in the multi-faceted and multi-
dimensional struggle for rights and resources in the Niger Delta are numerous, amorphous and ill-organised 
as a single movement. Moreover, their demands may vary greatly from jobs for unemployed youths to the 
release from prison of a notoriously corrupt godfather-Governor of Bayelsa state. Also, the armed 
opposition in the Niger Delta does not involve a clear and bi-polar confrontation between a rebel movement 
and a state. As noted in the previous chapter, there are numerous conflicts being played out in the Niger 











Even if those leading the criminal syndicates that operate this sophisticated enterprise are 
involved in the activities of armed militia movements, it is highly unlikely that their 
objectives include delivering justice to the Niger Delta. Indeed, it is reported that militias 
are 'given control' over rewarding oil-bunkering routes, by virtue of a strategic collusion 
of oil company staff, army elements, vigilante groups, militias and their political patrons, 
in exchange for one particular political machine.23o But the co-optation of social 
movements, whether they are militant or not, by corrupt state and local administrations 
and even Toes in their efforts to increase their security, must be seen as an, at least 
partial dislodgement from political, social engagement. The simple reason for this is that 
the actions of the movements are no longer directed at achieving their stated social, 
economic and political goals - although this could be claimed with the 'direct form of 
resource control argument' - but rather at ensuring their own share in the profits from the 
Niger Delta war economy. One result is that, instead of directing their actions to the 
Toes and the government, the militia movements turn their weapons on each other. The 
turf war that was played out between NDPVF leader Asari Dokubo and NDV leader 
Ateke Tom, with active sponsorship of Delta state governor Peter Odili in 2003-4, is one 
example of this scenario, with dramatic consequences for the Delta population?31 
Another source of income for the new wave of militant groups that emerged in the Niger 
Delta in the late 1990s is hostage taking of expatriate staff.232 Starting as a last resort of 
autonomously operating groups of aggrieved villagers venting their frustration to Toes 
and the federal government about their miserable situation and demanding jobs and other 
forms of redress,233 by the turn of the century the kidnapping of Toe staff was becoming 
a full-fledged industry. In 2006 MEND and similar groups are said to have taken more 
than 150 TOe staff hostage, of which half are foreigners. 234 MEND deploys the strategy 
as its number one tool for extorting acquiescence from Toes and the federal 
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3.2. Greed and grievance in a political economy 
'It is often at the intersections of wealth and poverty, and extraction, dispossession and 
pollution, where violent conflict emerges. This is because oil invariably fuels dreams of 
an 'EI Dorado' in the hearts and minds of many, who are nonetheless shocked out of 
their reverie by the appalling poverty and pollution that oil leaves in its wake, and the 
way it violates social institutions, cultures, norms and values. In this context, those who 
are excluded.from the 'spoils of oil' are often very bitter, and seek to gain access or 
power over oil through any means. Due to the high premium placed on oil, the stakes in 
controlling it are exceedingly high, andfor the most part, this is a matter of life and 
death. It is in this way that the oil paradox is at the very epic entre of violence. Oil power 
is seized rather than negotiated, and. once taken, is often defended by force. In the 
volatile world C!f oil politics. power is largely defined by the capacity to deploy force, 
either to seize or defend the control of oil. It is fundamentally about the survival of the 
strongest. ,127 
What Obi fails to mention in this accurate summation of the 'oil paradox' that forms a 
breeding ground for the grievance-greed nexus, is that oil does not merely violate social 
institutions, cultures, norms and values, it transforms them. What Ikelegbe l28 calls 
'institutions of violence' emerge and evolve within the parameters of a violent system. In 
chapter 4, a discussion of these institutions of violence is to follow. In the current chapter 
an analytical framework is laid out by virtue of which the emergence of ethnic militia 
movements in the Niger Delta may be explained. Their emergence is not limited to the 
moment when these movements came into existence, but includes the process through 
which they adapted themselves to changing circumstances and became what they are 
today. The structure of the Nigerian social order, including its federalist arrangement, the 
'oil paradox', neo-patrimonialism and patronage networks on the state and local levels, 
exclusivist consequences of traditional rule and customary law in a society that has been 
subjected to an explosive population growth in the last decades is the vantage point from 
which the process will be analysed. 
The theory of Galtung seeks to utilise definitions of peace and violence as a 'scientific 
strategy,129 in order to come to grips with the structural conditions in which violent 
In c.1. Obi, The oil paradox: 4. 
128 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria': 209. 
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rebellion occurs. His analytical framework will serve as a guiding light for identifying the 
social dynamics of the Niger Delta system. Within this system the driving forces of 
rebellion can roughly be abstracted into two models: the grievance-driven, i.e. organised 
mass-based resistance against social injustice; and greed-driven, i.e. opportunities seen 
and seized by a political and economic elite for making financial gains from armed 
conflict. To discern the explanatory power of both models the ideas of Collier and 
Hoeffier l30 will be discussed for the greed view, and Burton's basic human needs theory 
for the view that emphasises the significance of grievance. 131 
3.2.1. The question of grievance and greed 
There is no denying that what Ikelegbe calls an 'economy of conflict' 132 has emerged in 
the Niger Delta. The bloody struggle for oil resources and benefits is rampant, as has 
been described in the previous chapter. A clandestine market in bunkered oil, arms and 
elections muscle has pervaded the Niger Delta 'civil society'. But the struggle for oil 
resources and benefits (greed-driven) can not easily be divorced from the social struggle 
that is pursued against 'the nature of distribution of costs and benefits of oil that has 
disinherited, marginalised and neglected [the oil-bearing communities].'133 In a way, the 
two struggles are one and the same, waged against a Northern hegemony that has usurped 
power as much as it has done oil. 
Because of the nature of the Nigerian socio-political order with its pyramids of patronage, 
the struggle against the Northern hegemony that has accumulated both power and oil 
wealth, is inextricably connected to the struggle against the lower echelons of this 
pyramid. Thus, the struggle against a local gerontocracy of traditional rulers who rely on 
customary law to exclude youths, settlers and women from power, can not be separated 
from the struggle against an exclusionist, over-centralised regime, because the lower 
levels of the pyramid derive their power and their resources from the top. 
130 P. Collier and A. Hoefiler, 'Greed and grievance in civil war', Oxford Economic Papers, VoI.56,No.4 
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Chiefs and traditional rulers in the Niger Delta have received statutory payments since 
before the beginning of colonial rule, when British and other traders would pay homage 
to the kings and chiefs of the realms that they wanted to trade with. During colonial rule 
this practice was kept alive, but adapted to modern circumstances: the chiefs were 
provided with allocations to fulfil their governing role. When the oil industry emerged, 
oil companies were included in the 'tradition', and until this day, they too are expected to 
pay customary payments for land use. While the influence of the chiefs was reduced 
under laws such as the 1978 Land Use Act, they continued to wield considerable informal 
power. Chieftaincy titles have proved very valuable commodities as corruption became 
endemic and rulers began to collaborate with oil companies and government to serve their 
private financial interests. 134 
3.2.2. lkelegbe: Causality and dynamics of conflict and resistance 
Ikelegbe lists three explanatory dimensions of his 'economics of war thesis', which is 
based on a version of the greed model. The first relates to the cause of rebellion and wars. 
The second dimension refers to the rebellion being sustained and prolonged by 'war 
economic opportunities and trade networks.' The th ird is that the economy of war is seen 
to underpin violence in conflicts. With this in mind, the emergence of ethnic militia 
movements in the Niger Delta can be broken up in three dimensions: 1) their nascence, 
and what caused it; 2) their sustenance, or dynamics once they came into existence; 3) 
their violent, at least in certain cases, nature. 135 
Although Ikelegbe applies the greed-model as an analytical framework to examine the 
interfaces linking the Nigerian state, TOCs, the international community and youth 
militias, he does not put all his money on one horse. In fact, he states that 'there is no 
innateness of natural resources that compels conflict. It is rather the hegemonic struggles 
between superordinated and subordinated groups and the nature of management and 
134 1CG 115: 20. 











appropriation of resources that engender conflict.' 136 Ikelegbe warns against the danger of 
oversimplifying the content of conflicts, and adds that most conflicts have a 'fairly high 
political content.' 137 In its causal potency, Ikelegbe deems his model to be weak. Because 
the economy of war may be a by-product, rather than a cause of conflict, he posits that 
economic opportunism is 'incidental' and 'a perversion of resistance. d 38 He states that: 
'The nexus between economics and conflict environment is [ ... ] much more than the issues of 
causality. It may relate to the actual dynamics of conflict and resistance; the funding of both the 
state and rebel movements, the exploitation of opportunities that emerge from disorder and 
violence, the multiplication of violence and violence institutions, the proliferation of arms and the 
intervention of metropolitan centres bent on maintaining supplies of critical minerals, and how all 
these underpin the prolongation of conflicts in resource rich regions.' 139 
The problem that arises inevitably from the question of grievance or greed is pin-pointed 
in the paragraph above. To say that either grievance or greed is the cause for the 
emergence of armed militia movements is to miss a very important point. Not only are 
the two closely connected, but the environment in which ethnic militia movements 
emerge consists of a plethora of factors, variables and dynamics that are radically more 
complex than merely greed or grievance. 
3.2.3. Reno: Structures/or social space 
Reno places the emergence of armed groups In the context of collapsing states that 
provide a multitude of structures facilitating predatory behaviour, and a socio-political 
order consisting of 'systems of personal rule behind the fayade of formal statehood.' He 
posits that 'armed groups that develop in this type of regime reflect a political economy 
in which power is tied to exclusive control of even clandestine economies.' 140 Reno uses 
the Nigerian experience as a case to enhance his 'looting model.' He argues that it is in 
the networks of political elites, which were constructed in the process of Nigeria's 
perpetual state collapse 'to control economic opportunity and in order to exercise power 
136 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria': 213. 
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and control people,' 141 that the social space In which anned groups could form was 
created. 
The grievance model allows a focus on deeper causes of conflict. Grievances are 
perceived as results of the frustration of basic human needs. Burton's ideas about these 
needs and how they relate to violent conflict will be discussed in the next section. Here it 
is important to underscore the difference between the two models. Although grievance 
can not always be completely disconnected from greed, as driving forces they are distinct. 
Especially where social structures put certain groups at a disadvantage, and the 
distribution of resources occurs through an unsatisfactory process, the subordinated 
groups may tum against the institutions that facilitate this unequal distribution, possibly 
with violent means. 
The importance of ethnicity as a component of either the greed- or the grievance-induced 
agitation should not be underestimated. Perceptions of exclusion can propel ethnic 
mobilisation, and the structures for profit transmission are often ethnically defined. The 
latter is directly connected to the fact that patronage networks are usually shaped along 
ethnic lines. 
3.3. The greed model of Collier and Hoeffler 
In the previous section much has been said about the greed model that can be helpful 
when examining the causes of rebellion. Yet, a more thorough understanding of the ideas 
of Hoeffler and Collier with regard to their greed model is required if it is to be compared 
with other models for its power to explain the emergence of ethnic militia movements in 
the Niger Delta. Collier and Hoeffler attempt to explain why rebellion occurs, in order to 
develop an econometric model that can predict future rebellions. The desire to predict 
rebellions is a feature of the current international paradigm emphasising - or calling for -
'crisis prevention' and 'early warning'. Scholars have objected that this preoccupation is 
at the expense of urgent attention for the structural causes of violence. 142 
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In their argument, Collier and Hoeftler list a number of quantitative indicators of 
opportunity that create the circumstances in which rebellion is likely to occur. Firstly, 
they say, there should be the opportunity to finance rebellion. 143 The authors identify 
three sources of financing: 
1. extortion of natural resources; 
2. donations from diasporas; 
3. subventions from hostile governments. 
Another quantitative indicator is the low cost of starting a rebellion. 144 One of the aspects 
of this is the cost of mobilising a rebel army. For young men to decide that they leave 
whatever income source they have at the outset in change for the measly payment that 
can be expected from a rebel movement, topped up with whatever revenue can be 
collected from loot, there are three 'proxies for foregone income'. These are: 
1. income per capita; 
2. male secondary schooling; 
3. growth rate of the economy. 
Collier and Hoeftler present some proxies for 'grievance rebellion' toO: 145 
1. ethnic or religious hatred; 
2. political oppression; 
3. political exclusion; 
4. economic inequality. 
Other factors that may be significant in the grievance model are: ethnic fractionalization, 
democracy, mountainous terrain, land inequality and geographic dispersion of the 
143 P. Collier and A. Hoerner, 'Greed and grievance in civil war': 565. 
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population. I46 However, after 'robust testing' the authors conclude that the greed model 
works best. 147 
Interestingly, through a different route, Collier comes to a similar conclusion as Ake 
when he argues that in efforts to prevent civil war or rebellion there is more sense in 
focusing on economic development. But while Collier maintains that this process alone 
will eliminate the factors that make a country prone to conflict I48, Ake, supported by 
Nathan, Odendaal and Amoo I49 stresses that while development and economic growth are 
important, real improvement in the lives of the masses will come with their social 
empowerment. Without it, economic development and growth will remain skewed, and 
'ethnic' conflict and rebellions continue. 'In fact,' so say Odendaal and Amoo, 'they 
could contribute to inter-group conflict, particularly when economic growth is perceived 
by aggrieved groups to be accompanied by inequitable distribution.' 150 Collier says 
almost exactly the opposite, namely that democracy can lead to more conflict in societies 
that lack economic growth. I51 A later section in this chapter will briefly discuss the 
development nexus. 
In the same line rests the problem of an anticipated rise of the derivation formula in 
favour of the oil-producing communities, which means that the revenue allocated to the 
Niger Delta states would increase, while corruption and patronage networks continue to 
siphon off of a large share of this money. There are different opinions about this. Some 
Niger Delta activists say that corruption on a local level is something they can deal with 
after they have achieved an increase of their share of oil revenues. I52 Others stress that 
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there is no point in increasing the oil-bearing states' share in oil revenue, as long as the 
local and state elites will put the lion's share in their own pockets. 153 
The greed-model of Collier and Hoeffler has been subjected to sharp criticism. Nathan 
identifies deep flaws in Collier and Hoeffler's model, one of which is the lack of actual 
analysis and understanding of their subject. The greatest problem, according to Nathan, is 
that: '[Collier and Hoeffler] seek to ascertain the causes of civil war without studying 
civil wars, and attempt to study the motives of rebels without studying rebels and 
rebellions.' 154 According to Nathan Collier and Hoeffler's proxies are 'arbitrary and often 
spurious' and the meaning assigned to them is too restricted. Moreover, he observes a 
lack of testing of the causality between the proxies and what they are presumed to 
precipitate. 155 
The greed paradigm of Collier and Hoeffler has profound ramifications for the way in 
which movements such as MEND and MOSOP are regarded. Firstly, it requires that a 
distinction is made between violent, 'entrepreneurial', predatory organisations on the one 
hand and non-violent, social activist, grievance-driven organisations on the other. The 
accounts ofthe emergence and evolving structures of MOSOP, MEND and IYC that will 
follow in chapter 4 reveal that the possibility of this distinction is a phantom. So, what 
role do heterogeneous organisations like the above-mentioned play in the diced-and-
sliced view of socio-economic dynamics that Collier and Hoeffler propagate? In the next 
chapter, these and other questions will be addressed. 
3.4. Basic human needs theory of John Burton 
Human needs theory is a collection of ideas that aim to provide a framework for the 
principles that are known from humanistic psychology and applied social psychology. In 
order to construct a human-centred approach to conflict, where there is not merely focus 
on interests, but on needs, John Burton has incorporated 'the individual, and identity 
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groups of the individual as units of analysis in social sciences and particularly conflict 
theory.,156 The concept of identity provides a key link between needs theory and conflict 
resolution theory. 157 
Needs theory is traditionally focused on human development. It assumes that humans 
have 'basic, universal socio-psychological needs that underpin their growth and 
development.,158 These basic human needs not only drive human behaviour, but the 
pursuit of the satisfaction of these needs is what defines people's perception of being 
human. In this view the basis of conflict is unequal distribution of power, because it 
frustrates people's ability to satisfy their needs. Some basic human needs are: 
recognition, inclusion, identity, security and participation. Because the pursuit of the 
gratification of these needs is what defines 'being human', it is impossible to compromise 
on them. 
With this in mind, it is not difficult to foresee a problem occurrmg on the level of 
societies in which often one individual or group's needs can conflict with another's. Even 
when the needs themselves do not conflict, satisfiers, which are the means people and 
groups adopt to pursue their needs, can. So, while a development process can reduce the 
risk of conflict, or even resolve conflict, it can equally help produce conflict. 159 One 
example given by Burton is the satisfier known as 'role seeking', which occurs in pursuit 
of 'recognition'. Role seeking can manifest itself in competition for scarce resources. 160 
Potapchuk examines how processes of government can be evaluated from a human needs 
perspective. He states the basic human needs that individuals harbour towards their 
government to be these: 
(a) To be treated as well as others are treated no matter how they are linked to a 
particular identity group; 
156 J. Burton, 'Contlict': I. 
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(b) To have some level of surety in forecasting the result of interactions with others; 
(c) To be safe or protected from others as each pursues his/her individual goals. 161 
These needs are also known as the right to self-determination. To speak of a right to self-
determination shifts the perspective of analysis from a psychological to a legal-political 
point of view. The consequence of this is not as profound as the power-rights dichotomy 
discussed in the previous section. Rights enable people to pursue their self-realisation, i.e. 
the gratification of their needs. The state offers the freedom, and the limits within which 
this pursuit can take place in the form of laws. The fundamental law that encodes the 
basic freedoms and limits within which groups and individuals may pursue the 
satisfaction of their human needs is, obviously, a constitution. The need for self-
determination and the gratification of this need can be regarded in process terms and in 
outcome terms. Processes of governance that gratify people's need for control (i.e. self-
determination) must allow participation plus 'the development of the social and political 
capacities of each individual' .162 With regard to the outcomes of needs-oriented processes 
of governance, Potapchuk states that: 'The role a federal government has in creating and 
implementing state and local processes, judicial and administrative processes and 
international processes is enormous. One of the types of outcomes of systems of 
governance is thus the creation of systems for participation.' 163 
Odendaal and Amoo warn that in conflict situations protagonists are invariably tempted 
to harbour scepticism about the genuineness of the other's motivations. 'Suspicion, 
distrust and fear inspire such conspiracy theories, which see the reason for the conflict 
primarily in terms of greed, malevolence or unreasonableness of the other party.' 164 
Burton's approach departs from the assumption that individuals are neither 'naturally 
good', nor 'naturally bad'; they are 'naturally needy' .165 
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Because conflicts occur as 'people experience perceived or real obstructions in their drive 
to meet their needs and interests,166, resolution of conflicts is to be found in the 
(re)structuring of social and political institutions. The importance of respect for and 
implementation of a human rights regime is underscored by Odendaal and Amoo as the 
'best framework for the political accommodation of basic human needs. 167 Moreover, 
they stress that the challenge that governments face in catering for basic human needs is 
fundamentally political, and not, as Collier and Hoeftler have it, economic. 168 
With regard to the federalist structure of the Nigerian state, even more critical than the 
derivation formula is the process of allocating resources, which is a political issue. 169 
Nigeria's 'federal character principle' is in its initial purpose a wonderful tool aimed to 
ensure that all the country's regions were represented at central decision-making levels. 
However, the sustained legacy of over-centralised authoritarian rule rendered this 
opportunity defunct, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. 170 
In their discussion of a human needs-based approach for the political management of 
ethnic conflict Odendaal and Amoo propose a number of measures that are deemed to 
advance solutions. One of these is the principle of proportionality in the distribution of 
resources and opportunities amongst groups. This principle is seen to offer solutions for 
the Nigerian contention over the distribution of oil revenue between the oil-producing 
and other regions. 171 Constitutional arrangements are instrumental in this because it is the 
framework in which the locus of power, state structure, structure of parliament and the 
electoral system are determined. 172 'Elections are about allocating power', Odendaal and 
Amoo confirm. 173 It is therefore no surprise that the fiercest violence, both state-
166 a.s. Amoo and A. Odendaal, 'The political management of ethnic conflict': 18. 
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community and inter-community violence, In the Niger Delta has occurred during 
elections. 
3.5. Johan Galtung's structural violence 
Quite similar to Burton, Galtung connects psychological processes to structural social 
dynamics. Galtung comes up with a definition of violence that changes the way peace and 
peace research is regarded. After he presumes that 'peace is the absence of violence,' he 
discerns multiple dimensions of violence. 174 Personal violence is the violence that is most 
commonly known to us, because it is manifest. It is direct and physical, and it involves a 
person who performs the violence and another person who is subjected to it. Structural 
violence is indirect, inflicted by circumstances, not by individuals directly, although 
individuals remain responsible. There is no actor who can be identified as a perpetrator of 
the violence, because the violence is built into the structure of society, '[ .. ] and shows up 
as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. [ ... ] Resources are unevenly 
distributed, as when income distributions are heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly 
distributed, medical services existent in some districts and for some groups only, and so 
on. Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly 
distributed.' 175 
Although Galtung states that the two types of violence, structural and direct, are 
independent, and the one does not presuppose the other, there is a causal relationship 
between the two. 176 To explore this causality further, he asks 4 argumentative questions, 
of which the fourth is most relevant to this issue: 
I. structural violence is sufficient to abolish personal violence; 
2. structural violence is necessary to abolish personal violence; 
3. personal violence is sufficient to abolish structural violence; 
4. personal violence is necessary to abolish structural violence. 
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The fourth, a 'revolutionary proposition with a certain currency' 177, is tempting, but 
disqualified by Galtung on empirical, theoretical and axiological grounds. 
The best known example of a social order that is structured on the basis of unequal 
opportunities, where limited access to health, education and power are linked to a low 
income, is the class society.178 Galtungs view on society and its dynamics with relation to 
peace and conflict can not be understood without a regard for the role of class disparities 
in the social structure. 
3.6. Transition and democratisation 
With regard to democratisation processes in Africa it has been argued that this has not in 
the least bit led to an emancipation of the masses. Ake speaks of an imminent "second 
independence", this time not from colonial masters but from incompetent and exploitative 
indigenous rulers.' 179 According to Ake, this second independence will involve a 
democratisation that is not liberal, but socially oriented. The reality that African life is 
still predominantly rural means that the focus on individual political rights of liberal 
democracy has little meaning for many Africans. Rather, a truly democratic 'human 
rights regime', i.e. a regime that means something to the masses, would harbour notions 
of freedom, well-being and democratic participation that are appropriate to people in rural 
communities. 'For in that setting, freedom is embedded in the realities of communal life; 
people worry less about their rights and how to secure them than finding their station and 
its duties and they see no freedom in mere individualism.,I80 Ake puts the 'basic human 
need' for participation in perspective. In a market society the notion of political 
participation arises from the autonomy of the individual, and the 'real or potential clash 
of its claims with others.' 181 But in a communal society, where the well-being of 
177 J. Galtung, 'Violence, peace, and peace research': lSI. 
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everyone depends on how everyone fills 'his/her station and its duties', one does not 
participate against others, but with others for the well-being of the society as a whole. 182 
Ake contends that real democratisation needs more than elections. A transformation of 
the autocratic, post-colonial state, which has, in the case of Nigeria, retained the 
concentration of power and the command structure of preceding military regimes, is 
required. 183 Although Ake is a strong advocate for the development/democratisation 
nexus, he denounces the prejudice that is 'implicit in the tendency to put economic 
development before democracy.' 184 The implementation of SAP under the guise of 
market liberalisation and democratisation plays a key role in Ake's argument. Indeed, he 
observes how none of the parties involved in the adoption of the SAP appear to have had 
any problem with the undemocratic nature in which it was adopted and implemented. It is 
important in the context of this study to understand that SAPs were deliberate 
government policy for economic reform. In Nigeria, as in other African countries, their 
effect can hardly be overstated. They have caused 'deep despair, widespread malnutrition 
and premature death, and [ ... ] much of the burden falls on children.'185 There will be 
further discussion on the detrimental effects of SAP further in this chapter. 
Ake argues that development policies and strategies can not be understood 'without 
referring constantly to the nature of the state and the dynamics of the social forces in 
which it is embedded.' 186 Because of circumstances that reach back to the colonial 
experience, the relationship between the African state and the bulk of the population 
tends to be hostile. The state has been privatised to serve the interests of a dominant 
faction of the elite, who compete with other elites to capture and exploit the state. None 
of these elites' objectives is to transform the social structure of the state. In fact, 'Given a 
182 C. Ake, Democratization of disempowerment in Africa: 6. 
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choice between social transformation, especially development, and political domination, 
most African leaders choose the latter.' 187 
Osaghae argues that in addition to the first liberation movement in Africa, which led to 
decolonisation, the second liberation process, which took place in the post-Cold War 
period, has now failed as well. The political and economic reforms of the second 
liberation movement have largely remained inconclusive. This, according to Osaghae, is 
due to the 'unresolved crisis of the state, the lack of relative autonomy on the part oflocal 
citizens.' 188 
3.6.1. Ethnicity 
The issue of ethnicity in the context of transition and democratisation in Africa is highly 
relevant. Osaghae argues that ethnicity should be approached as 'a combination of an 
emancipatory ideology, a pedestal for challenging and exacting concessions from the 
state, a principle of state organization and a critical resource for political competition.' 189 
Osaghae sees the transitional society as a political environment that provides, due to its 
inherent turbulence and crisis, 'opportunities for political access and competition and for 
ventilating frustrations, grievances and seeking redress, all of which encourage more 
intense and desperate political action.' Osaghae discerns that ethnic political parties and 
organisations, including ethnic militias, become driving agents in these processes, which 
have the potential to alter power configurations. 190 
3.6.2. State col/apse 
Nigeria is a country where democratisation has on many fronts been shatlow, 
development has meant ruthless economic measures aimed at growth, but resulting in 
187 C. Ake, Democracy and development in Africa: 42. 
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shattered lives, and elections have enabled people to 'vote without choosing' .191 
Authoritarian state structures and informal patronage networks have remained in place, 
rule of law is nominal and government accountability is weak. The failure of 
development strategies like SAP in Africa in general, and in Nigeria in particular, is an 
essential component of the hostile relationship between the state and its people. l92 The 
failure to deliver basic public goods and services, guarantee security, equality before the 
law, and accountability has made the state seem all but irrelevant. 
However, when it comes to the power conceded by the federal government and its control 
over resource extraction and distribution of revenue the state is not weak at all. The 
power that the state exerts with its control over the military, and its proven willingness to 
use the federal armed forces to suppress domestic revolt, is immense. The state may be 
irrelevant in some aspects, which has caused many to seek refuge and security with 
identity groups, both ethnic and religious organisations. But in other ways the state has 
become an enemy, rather than a void, 'to be evaded, cheated, or defeated, as 
. . d' 193 cIrcumstances permltte . 
'Throughout Nigeria's independent history, the police and military, while failing to curb 
rising crime and politically inspired violence, have used unrestrained force on fellow 
citizens and caused thousands of deaths. The restoration of democracy has not ended 
widespread harassment, abuse, torture and extrajudicial murder by security forces. 
Massive reprisal killings have occurred, such as in 1999, when an army unit destroyed 
Odi, a town in Bayelsa State, allegedly in response to the assassination of twelve 
policemen by local youths. According to research published in 2002, 2,483 people 
died in the massacre. In 200 I, following the abduction and killing of nineteen soldiers by 
an armed group, about 200 civilians were killed in a retaliatory operation in Benue State. 
There have been numerous similar, though less murderous, incidents ever since.' 194 
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In his book, 'Citizen and subject', Mamdani argues that the countries of equatorial Africa 
inherited from the colonial period a particular form of rule that maintained a bifurcated 
state, recognizing two types of political identities. One was civic, preserved for citizens 
who had (differentiated) rights under civil law, enforced by the central state. The other, 
inferior, identity was ethnic, preserved for subjects who lived under the authority of 
customary law, administered through the Native Authority.195 With these two identities, 
the colonial powers had created a tool for administering a system of indirect rule that 
would allow them to extract the necessary taxes, labour and whatever other outputs they 
needed from their colonies with minimal means. The colonial doctrine went that the 
subjects were natives to the colonized land and the (differentiated) citizens were settlers. 
The proto-type settlers were obviously the whites. 196 
In the context of Rwanda and its neighbouring countries the dichotomy described above 
had profound consequences for people's access to land and, in connection with this, 
identity politics. For poor subjects, who could by definition not own private property, the 
ethnic space was the only way of gaining access to land. Citizens could buy land, given 
that they had the financial resources, but they had no claim to 'customary' land from an 
ethnic group's home area. This is significant, as Mamdani explains how the advantage of 
being subjected to customary laws and belonging to an ethnic sphere, was the motivation 
for many of the rural poor to remain attached to their customary rights, even when after 
independence they had, at least theoretically, gained access to civil rights. 197 
In Nigeria, the British instituted their own system of indirect rule on the amalgamated 
nations of what became Nigeria in 1914. The variety of these nations existed of much 
more than simply a difference of cultural heritage and language. They consisted of 
195 M. Mamdani, 'When does a settler become a native? Colonial roots of citizenship in Equatorial and 
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different historical political units, social orders and economies. The Northern muslim 
theocracies, which had been dominated by the Sokoto Caliphate, were allowed by the 
British to maintain their rule so that the colonial power could utilise their administrative 
structures. 198 One of the liberties that the northern societies were granted was their 
'exemption' from missionary influence. Preserving the Islamic religion, and the feudal, 
centralised social structure of the North, which the British found to be more sophisticated 
than the polytheistic religions, and smaller, less hierarchical states and societies of the 
East and the South, had various consequences. 199 Firstly, it led to a great disparity in 
education levels between the North and the rest of the country. Literacy in the North has 
remained low in absolute numbers as well as relative to levels in the East and South-
West. In the Southern regions, through Western education, a nationalist consciousness 
emerged.2oo 
Moreover, the system of indirect rule led to the 'invention of a politically unified, though 
not ethnically homogenous, North that had never existed before.' The British offered the 
Northern emirs control of the Middle Belt, which consists of more than half of the 250 
Nigerian nationalities, and the emirs added the territory to their Northern influential 
sphere. The disastrous consequences of the distrust generated by the colonial state 
structure that was largely left intact after independence, of which the apotheosis was the 
civil war, have been addressed in Chapter 2. The native versus settler dichotomy related 
by Mamdani has a parallel, in Nigerian societies, which does not appear to have its root 
in colonial legacies. Although the British fanned ethnic prejudice in the North by housing 
southern immigrants, many of whom Igbos, in segregated foreigner's quarters 201, the 
current antagonisms between so-called 'indigenes' and 'non-indigenes' of states must be 
attributed to a provision in the 1979 constitution, which granted certain rights to 'a person 
whose parents or grandparents historically originated from a community within that 
state. ,202 The 1999 constitution uses the term indigene, but does not define it more 
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precisely. This continues to fuel local conflict and violence In all Nigeria's regions, 
particularly in the Middle Belt.203 
The "native versus settler" dichotomy has been exacerbated by the proliferation of 
states204, and has fuelled violence in the Niger Delta. The most intense confrontations 
have taken place between Itsekiris and Ijaws in Delta and Dndo States. The Warri crisis, 
as the conflict has been coined after the capital of Delta State where violence has been 
particularly intense, has cost thousands of lives and destroyed villages and property since 
its commencement in 1997.205 The first flare up of the conflict started after the relocation 
of local government headquarters from the Ijaw town of Ogbe-Ijaw to the Itsekiri 
community of Ogidigben. During the first three months of the conflict, hundreds are 
believed to have been killed. In addition, Shell flow stations were seized, and Shell staff 
taken hostage. The first stage of the crisis caused a cut in Shell's Nigeria output by 
210,000 barrels of oil per day for more than a week.206 
The handover of power from military to civilian rule in 1999 was accompanied by 
another flare up of violence leaving 200 people dead in raids between Itsekiri and Ijaw 
militias. The elections of 2003 were the setting of more violent confrontations, this time 
between Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo militias and Nigerian security forces, leaving 
thousands dead and many more homeless.207 
According to ICG 'some 40 per cent of the country's oil industry was shut down for 
weeks and some areas still have not returned to production. Chevron suffered $500 
million in infrastructure damage in addition to significant oil production losses. For a 
select few militant leaders - some of whom were front-line fighters in the attacks of 1997 
and 2003 - the rewards were lucrative. In 2004, several key Ijaw and Itsekiri militants 
were appointed to state and local government positions. In 2006, President Obasanjo's 
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government reserved an oil block drilling license for a company linked to members of the 
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), which actively coordinated and led 
Ijaw fighters during deadly conflicts in 1997, 1999 and 2003. Shell has admitted giving 
service contracts to FNDIC members.'208 
The Niger Delta IS home to 40 ethnicities, 250 languages and more than 3000 
communities. The Ijaw nation with 2 million members is the largest ethnic minority 
group in Nigeria, and divided in seven language groups and many dialects.209 It is 
tempting to reduce conflicts between and within groups to a competitive struggle for oil 
wealth, high positions in the state and local administration and power. But enmities such 
as the Itsekiri-Ijaw conflict have historical roots as well. The Itsekiri, for instance, who 
are a small group consisting of a few thousand members are perceived by the Ijaw as 
having been historically favoured by both the colonial regime and the successive military 
rulers of post-independence.210 
3.7. Conclusion: The development nexus 
Burton, Galtung and Collier and Hoeffler address the causes of conflict and rebellion 
from very different vantage points. The former focuses on grievances that motivate rebels 
and their support base, the latter on greed, i.e. the opportunities that are perceived to be 
present for profiting financially from civil war. What makes the theory of Collier and 
Hoeffler relevant to the Niger Delta situation and to the three ethnic militia movements 
that will be discussed as cases in chapter 4? They argue that the factors causing rebellion 
and civil war are not political, but economic, as insurgent groups are usually motivated 
by control over resources. With their theory in hand, one could easily conduct a study to 
establish why an all-out civil war in the Niger Delta has not commenced. But whatever 
conclusions that analysis might deliver, the fact remains that the Niger Delta violence 
causes more than 1,000 deadly casualties per annum, which renders it the status of a high-
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intensity contlict -or contlicts.211 This should legitimise at least treating the Niger Delta 
agitation as a rebellion or a civil war, and taking the ethnic militia movements that are the 
focus of this study at face value. The proximity of large amounts of natural resources 
plays a significant role in both constructs. The theory of Galtung focuses less on causes 
than on the structures in which peace and violence exist. A society, in his view, is a 
dynamic system that functions through social and political interactions. Galtungs view on 
society and the role that violence plays in it is helpful with regard to the analysis of the 
emergence of the ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta. His and Burton's 
emphasis on the process of resource distribution, rather than on the allocations 
themselves, is especially significant where economic development and growth are 
concerned. Both Collier and Burton mention the risks that are part of 'open competition' 
for scarce resources, in Collier's view brought on by undue democracy, and according to 
Burton by contlicting 'satisfiers'. 
Popular participation in the process of distribution is considered to be an important way 
to avert or manage escalation of contlict. Odendaal and Amoo reason that the political 
content of ethnic contlicts is a given, since the underlying drive is usually related to a 
tlawed process of resource distribution.212 The means through which this process and its 
outcome are challenged can vary in such degree that the border between the struggle for a 
just and equitable distribution of resources and rights on one hand, and a struggle for 
personal wealth accumulation and power on the other is blurred. Indeed, power and rights 
lie in each other's extension. However, while power is a relationship between one who 
can enforce his will on another, and this other, who can not, rights are means through 
which people can achieve their self-realisation. The nuance between greed-driven and 
grievance-driven rebellion appears correspondingly to lie in the objective as an 
opportunity to attain, for example, education, self-determination, health and employment, 
rather than these attainments as objectives themselves. 
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This would explain why community development projects of TOCs and promises from 
the federal government to deliver jobs and infrastructure have received less than 
enthusiastic response from Niger Delta activists.213 Hospitals and schools built by TOCs 
have often been neglected and dilapidated because of a lack of long-term planning and 
financial sustenance. The oil-communities have slated that the development projects 
offered to them were merely interventions to alleviate the symptoms of their complaint, 
but not the complaint itself. 
The focus on process explains the significance of economic development as one of the 
attributes of peace. This comes clearly forward from Galtungs analytical perspective. It 
also shows how, without the political power to ensure a long-term involvement in the 
decision-making process that shapes the distribution of resources and opportunities, for 
the bulk of the people there is little value in economic development and growth. Ake 
notes how development is inextricably connected to peace, not merely because it delivers 
the dividends that people expect from peace and democratisation, but because it provides 
the environment in which individuals and groups can strive for their self-realisation?14 
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4. Emergence of MOSOP, lye and MEND: a 
transformation of movements 
Introduction 
In this chapter the theory on rebel movements and armed conflict will be connected with 
three cases. In Chapter 3 the theories of Galtung, Burton and Collier and Hoeffler were 
introduced and the additional viewpoints of Ikelegbe and Reno on the emergence of rebel 
movements in Nigeria and the Niger Delta political economy were discussed. However, 
the three case movements were merely glossed over in passing. 
The emergence of the militia movements in the Niger Delta is described as a process, 
with special regard for the issues that came forward in the discussion of theory in the 
previous chapter. The aim is to establish in which respects the theories are in concordance 
with the reality of the cases and where they fail. For a sufficient answer to the research 
question it is not just important to know why or how the movements emerged. It is 
essential to understand what it was exactly that came to exist, and how it was structured. 
What was the internal logic of these movements, and how did they transform as their 
internal and external environment changed? 
Two aspects in particular reveal something about the nature of the militia movements, 
rather than just why they emerged. These two aspects are: I) internal and external 
organisational structure, and 2) the transformation that took place within the 
organisations and the larger entities of which they are part, after they were born. The 
interaction between these two values and the dynamics between all the elements that 
make up the Niger Delta political economy will draw a picture that is expected to 
improve understanding of the nature of these organisations and what drives them. 
In addition to shedding new light on the emergence of the Niger Delta militia movements 
the explanatory value of the theoretical frameworks introduced by Burton and Collier and 











nature of the struggle and the structure of the three case organisations: MOSOP, IYC and 
MEND will be reviewed, and assessed with the use of the analytical tools of Galtung, 
Burton and Collier and Hoeffier. 
4.2. Political economy as a conflict system 
According to Reno, in a political economy "power is tied to exclusive control of 
economies." Seen from this vantage point the Niger Delta is a political economy where 
economic factors blend with social and political drives. Resistance against the state and 
TOCs has been infected and transformed by the multilevel struggle for resources that 
pervades the reality of Nigerian politics. In addition, a 'regime of state repression and 
corporate violence has further generated popular and criminal violence, lawlessness, 
illegal appropriations and insecurity. ,215 
It will have become clear that greed and grievance, like political, social and economic 
power cannot be divorced. Not only that, they reinforce each other in a process that 
causes a transformation of institutions. Ikelegbe speaks of a 'proliferation of arms and 
institutions and agencies of violence ranging from the Nigerian Armed Forces to 
community, ethnic and youth militias, armed gangs and networks, pirates, cultists and 
robbers. ,216 
Ikelegbe asserts that 'it is not greed per se that underpins wars.' In fact, state collapse and 
conflict provide an environment where armed groups fight for control over natural 
resources.217 This could cause an armed group that was previously or fundamentally a 
'genuine' resistance movement with social and political objectives, to transform into a 
predatory organisation. Underscoring his point that 'opportunism for primary commodity 
predation is not the cause of violent conflicts,' Ikelegbe comments that 'nowhere in 
Africa has a band of criminals grown into a rebel movement.,218 
215 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria': 208. 
216 A. Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria': 208. 
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As perceived by the aggrieved oil-minorities, the Nigerian government and TOCs 
structurally impinge on their rights by denying them control over and benefits from their 
mineral resources, but they nonetheless expect that these same communities bear the 
burden of social, environmental and economical costs that the extraction of oil and gas 
brings about. That does not mean that the communities' resistance against this injustice, 
even when it assumes the form of regaining control over these resources, can be simply 
determined as either greed- or profit-driven. 
Moreover, by the tum of the millennium TOCs and, to an extent, the government were 
beginning to apply new approaches when dealing with the Niger Delta agitators. The 
setting up of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2001 was one clear 
manifestation of this change in attitude. The NODe's objective was to 'diffuse the 
feeling that the region's oil wealth was being used largely for other parts of Nigeria.' 
Despite its ambitious spending on building schools, health centres, roads, and bringing 
water and electricity to local communities, the NDDC has not impressed the oil-bearing 
communities, and in particular the armed youths, much.219 
It appears that efforts, however genume m their intentions, to improve the SOCIO-
economic conditions of the Niger Delta population, are often met with scepticism. Some 
individual beneficiaries may be thankful and see their lives changed, but the militant 
actions continue and have even intensified since the year 2000. MEND's rejection of 
Obasanjo's promise to deliver jobs in oil, navy and police, to build a new motorway 
through the Niger Delta and instigate environmental repair, the building of schools, 
health care facilities and electrification, makes one thing quite clear. The conditions for 
peace might be mainly socio-economic demands, but these are meaningless without the 
constitutionally guaranteed power to participate in the decision-~aking process leading to 
better socio-economic policies.no This notion is supported by the basic human needs 
219 F.N. Ikome, 'Contlict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria: Issues and dynamics', Global Insight: A focus on 
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argument of Burton, and in particular the views of Potapchuk with regard to participative 
government. Indeed, it is not so much the results of participative policy-making, but the 
process that gives people the feeling that their needs are met, and, most importantly, that 
they have at least the opportunity to influence their own situation. 
As noted in Chapter 3 power and rights lie in each other's extension.221 Rights in this 
context pertain to the opportunities that individuals and communities have to achieve 
their self-realisation, while power, or the pursuit of power to control one's own resources 
and to exert influence over the process of distribution, constitutes their relationship with 
government and TOCs. In the political economy of the Niger Delta the connection 
between rights and power is profound, precisely because here, in the words of Reno, 
'power is tied to exclusive control of even clandestine economies. ,222 
The opening up of dialogue and the deployment of so-called community liaison officers 
to negotiate security with restive communities led to the emergence of a whole new 
dimension to the interactions and exchanges in the political economy of the Niger Delta. 
Invitations - and financial incentives - to take part in dialogue; local and international 
NGO's implementing their conflict resolution projects, and the increasing power of 
mediators and interlocutors have contributed to a new transformation of the Niger Delta 
political economy.223 Dialogue, it seems, is becoming just another currency in the Niger 
Delta. The virtual impossibility of verifying who is a militant, who is an oil-bunkerer, 
who is a hired thug for the governor's political machine, who yields authority over a large 
constituency, who is a warlord, who is a local politician-to-be, who is contending for a 
chieftaincy title, and who is all or a combination of these at the same time makes this 
'dialogue' a rather tricky addition to the Niger Delta interactions. It has been said that the 
regular state-level conventions, and even the odd national-level conferences that are 
currently being organised are for a large part utilised by militia leaders and other actors in 
environmental repair; 5. control over oil resources; 6. the release of Asari Dokubo and Governor 
Alamieyeseigha. 
221 See page 55 of this study. 
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the Niger Delta violence, to meet with their colleagues, strengthen their networks and 
decide on future actions. 
Contention over resource control is a political issue. But the illegal appropriation of and 
trade in mineral resources that take place on a large scale in the Niger Delta, is quite a 
different matter. Even if part or most of the profits derived from illegal bunkering is put 
back into the movements' structures to ensure their sustenance it cannot pass easily as a 
political action?24 Other arguments have been used by militia movements to legitimise 
illegal bunkering and other clandestine activities as being a part of the struggle for social 
justice. In fact, illegal bunkering has been downplayed by militia leaders who say that 
they are not stealing since they just take back what belongs to them.225 By many in the 
Niger Delta it is seen as 'a direct form of resource control.' The profits of this clandestine 
industry are estimated at between $1,5 and $4 billion per year.226 
Although illegal bunkering is said to be a key source of income for armed anti-
government groups in the Niger Delta, it is necessary to question who profits most from 
this industry. More and more indicators show that the real profiteers from grand-scale oil-
bunkering in the Niger Delta are not located in the region, or even in the country?27 
According to ICG, a "'cartel or mafia" of "highly placed and powerful individuals" who 
"run a network of agents to steal crude oil and finished products from pipelines in the 
Niger Delta region [ ... ] operate in similar fashion to drug barons and their activities are 
purely criminal, with financial benefits as their motive[.r 228 Oil is being paid for with 
arms and logistics. Police and army look the other way while giant container ships make 
their way from the Niger Delta creeks to the open sea?29 
224 Africa Research Bulletin, 'Nigeria. Delta tactics' (Blackwell Publishing: March, 2006): 16584-5. 
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Even if those leading the criminal syndicates that operate this sophisticated enterprise are 
involved in the activities of armed militia movements, it is highly unlikely that their 
objectives include delivering justice to the Niger Delta. Indeed, it is reported that militias 
are 'given control' over rewarding oil-bunkering routes, by virtue of a strategic collusion 
of oil company staff, army elements, vigilante groups, militias and their political patrons, 
in exchange for one particular political machine.23o But the co-optation of social 
movements, whether they are militant or not, by corrupt state and local administrations 
and even TOCs in their efforts to increase their security, must be seen as an, at least 
partial dislodgement from political, social engagement. The simple reason for this is that 
the actions of the movements are no longer directed at achieving their stated social, 
economic and political goals - although this could be claimed with the 'direct form of 
resource control argument' - but rather at ensuring their own share in the profits from the 
Niger Delta war economy. One result is that, instead of directing their actions to the 
TOCs and the government, the militia movements turn their weapons on each other. The 
turf war that was played out between NDPVF leader Asari Dokubo and NOV leader 
Ateke Tom, with active sponsorship of Delta state governor Peter Odili in 2003-4, is one 
example of this scenario, with dramatic consequences for the Delta population.231 
Another source of income for the new wave of militant groups that emerged in the Niger 
Delta in the late 1990s is hostage taking of expatriate staff. 232 Starting as a last resort of 
autonomously operating groups of aggrieved villagers venting their frustration to TOCs 
and the federal government about their miserable situation and demanding jobs and other 
forms ofredress,233 by the turn of the century the kidnapping ofTOC staff was becoming 
a full-fledged industry. In 2006 MEND and similar groups are said to have taken more 
than 150 TOC staff hostage, of which half are foreigners. 234 MEND deploys the strategy 
as its number one tool for extorting acquiescence from TOCs and the federal 
230 R. Eberlein, 'On the road to the state's perdition?': 586. 
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government235, but in general the approach has not yet yielded much result. Instead, 
President Obasanjo has made it clear that the criminal dimension that the youth agitation 
has assumed makes it liable to be crushed.236 In March 2006 the Nigerian House of 
Representatives agreed that the militants should be 'flushed out' and increased military 
. . h ~ d ')37 actIOn IS t e way lorwar .-
A practical problem of this approach is that it is not always clear who the kidnappers are. 
For instance, in October 2006 on three different occasions hostages were taken from 
Exxon Mobil (7 hostages), Shell (25 hostages and 14 soldiers killed) and an Agip ship 
was attacked, killing 9 soldiers. In January 2007, 6 Filipinos were abducted from a cargo 
ship. MEND was said to be responsible, and even the kidnappers introduced themselves 
as members of MEND. But MEND has denied all involvement in these actions and, in the 
case of the October actions, responded that the actions had 'not been planned. ,238 In the 
case of the Filipinos MEND said that the kidnappers must be local villagers.239 The 
problem that arises out of the amorphous structure of the new generation of ethnic militia 
movements in the Niger Delta will be addressed in another section of this chapter. 
4.3. Explanatory dimensions 
Ikelegbe concludes that although economic underpinnings do not cause the conflict, they 
become a part of the resistance and 'a resource for sustaining it.' An extensive 
proliferation of arms and the emergence of 'institutions of violence,' along with a 
dramatic increase of violent crime and more conflict are significant factors underlying the 
sustenance of resistance and conflict.24o 
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According to Ikelegbe the economics of war thesis has several explanatory dimensions. 
The three that are relevant for the analysis at hand are: 1. nascence; 2. dynamics; 3. 
nature. The first focuses on the actual causes of rebellion, i.e. the social and political 
grievances that are regarded by some to be merely a front for greed-driven motivations. 
The second, dynamics of a rebellion, refers to the objective of self-sustenance by warring 
groups and possibly prolongation of the conflict.. The third dimension refers to the 
violent nature of the conflict. This violent nature is aggravated by the economy of war as 
more actors 'struggle for economic space to further extraction of resource benefits.,241 
There is another dimension, not mentioned by Ikelegbe, but inherent in all three of the 
listed. The nature and the structure of the rebel organisations will be shaped by whatever 
caused them to emerge, whatever keeps them in existence and determines their violent 
nature. On the other hand, there might be certain organisational characteristics of a social 
movement that enables it to fend off the lure of violent and or criminal engagement. 
Could MOSOP, for instance, have remained a non-violent ethnic movement if its internal 
decision-making structure had been different? Like many of the ethnic militant 
movements in the Niger Delta, MOSOP experienced factionalisation from the early 
stages of its history. This internal friction was due to a number of factors which will be 
discussed in the following section, but the question is whether a more open, multi-faceted 
organisational structure like IYC and MEND would possibly have allowed MOSOP to 
sustain its internal contradictions and survive the opposition of its most conservative 
chiefs. 
Another aspect of the structure dimension has less to do with factionalisation, and more 
with the way that the ethnic militia movements function. The most apt summation to 
describe this phenomenon, which is perhaps a brilliant strategy, perhaps inherent in the 
nature of the social organisation of the Niger Delta human geography, is Okonta's 











observation that MEND is not an organisation at all, but an idea.242 His claim is 
corroborated, with specific referral to the IYC and its militant wing the Egbesu Boys of 
Africa, in the interviews of Sesay et al. from which emerges that many of the members 
are either formally or informally connected to more than one ethnic militia movement. 243 
Ikelegbe's dimensions of the economy of war, supplemented by the fourth dimension, 
namely the internal and external structure of rebel movements, are useful in the following 
analytical accounts of the emergence of MOSOP, IYC and MEND. 
4.4. Emergence of MOSOP 
The Ogoni are a small minority of roughly 500,000 people inhabiting a total land area of 
between 400 and 1000 square miles in Rivers State.244 They consist of three ethnic 
groups, the Khama (120,000 based on a 1963 census), Gokana (94,000), and Eleme 
(29,000). They are divided into six clans. They do not share a myth of common origin 
and constitute an ethnic group only on the basis of sharing a common language and 
culture.245 Still, the Ogoni are said to be a close-knit community of mainly farmers and 
fishermen, who, for millennia, managed to sustain a livelihood from their extremely 
densely populated land. The vital and careful management of their natural environment 
was abruptly disrupted when in 1958 Shell opened its first oil well in Ogoniland. By 
1993, when Shell was forced to suspend its operations in Ogoniland until further notice, 
the oil multinational was exploiting five big oil fields with ninety-six wells and five flow 
stations in the area. 246 
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Like in other Nigerian oil-bearing communities conflict with the TOCs began as isolated 
and sporadic peaceful protests against their activities, and evolved to well- organised 
mass movements posing a serious challenge to the oil-state alliance.247 It would, however, 
be a misinterpretation to regard MOSOP as an organisation of grassroots activism. In 
many ways, MOSOP was the reincarnation of a succession of elite cultural organisations 
and political pressure groups. The former was formed after the end of the Biafra War and 
had a firm base in traditional leadership of the Ogoni and high government 
functionaries,248 while the latter emerged from the Ogoni ethnic solidarity that was 
constructed at the dusk of the colonial era for fear of being dominated by the Igbos under 
d· . 249 a new IspensatlOn. 
The Ogoni ethnic mobilisation was, starting in the 1950s, led by Ogoni elite through 
'social clubs, political parties or state creation movements. ,250 At the Will ink 
Commission Inquiry, which was established by the British to investigate fears of 
Nigeria'S minorities of being dominated by the three majority groups after the imminent 
birth of an independent Nigeria, the Ogonis asked for a separate state for Ijaws and 
Ogonis.251 The creation of Rivers State in 1967 was a partial victory for the Ogoni elites, 
who were at the time organised in the Ogoni Divisional Union, a not entirely inclusive 
ethnic political association.252 Not until 1990, after extensive consultations by, among 
others, Ken Saro-Wiwa with all Ogoni sub-groups, would MOSOP become the second 
all-inclusive Ogoni ethnic association - representing all Ogonis- after the demise of the 
first, the Ogoni State Representative Assembly, formed in 1950.253 
The idea of MOSOP was contrived in part in Ogoni elite social clubs that had emerged in 
the 1980s. These clubs, together with a revival of the old nationalism of the 1950s were 
instrumental and provided the leadership for MOSOP. However, so stresses Obi, the 
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legwork and the mobilisation of the grassroots was done by the Ogoni youth.254 'They 
were the ones who welded the OBR onto local discourses and dialects, winning the 
villagers over, and heightening their faith in the possibility of realising Ogoni national 
autonomy and control of oil. ,255 
Under the influence, and later leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa MOSOP incarnated the 
Ogoni uprising which was without a doubt the first 'mass action mobilization in direct 
confrontation with the state,' since the rebellion of Adaka Boro.256 However, both 
internal and external Ogoni divisions were present from the beginning and manifested 
themselves in the opposition against Saro-Wiwa and against MOSOP representation of 
Ogoni interests in the 1 990s. ,257 
Local resistance against the detrimental impact of Shell's exploration and production 
activities began soon after the first oil wells were drilled, and mostly took the form of 
letters written by community leaders to Shell officials. Complaints initially focused on 
the flaring of gas that is released from the oil wells as a by-product of the extraction of 
oil, and related noise. Another grievance featured in these letters was the network of 
pipelines that was being laid out over community farmlands. All protests were ignored.258 
Protests increased after the first major incidents concerning oil-spillage occurred in 1970, 
shortly after the Biafra War. These left whole towns and significant amounts of farmland 
severely devastated, water contaminated and air polluted. More than thirty years after the 
oil blowout in Kegbara Dere the effects are still visible.259 The impact of the disaster in 
Kegbara Dere at the time can hardly be overstated: 
254 CI. Obi, 'The changing fonns of identity politics in Nigeria': 75. 
255 CI. Obi, 'The changing fonns of identity politics in Nigeria': 75. 
256 E.E. Osaghae, 'The Ogoni uprising: Oil politics, minority agitation and the future of the Nigerian state', 
African Affairs, VoI.94,No.376 (Oxford: University Press, 1995): 326. 
257 E.E. Osaghae, 'The Ogoni uprising': 334; CI. Obi, 'The changing fonns of identity politics in Nigeria': 
76. 
258 I. Okonta and O. Douglas, Where vulturesfeast: 75-6; One of the first of these letters was the "Humble 
Petition of Complaint on Shell-BP Operations in the Niger Delta," signed by chiefs and members of the 
Ogoni elite. CI. Obi, 'The changing forms of identity politics in Nigeria': 29. 











'The blowout lasted for several weeks, during which time crude hydrocarbon, sulphur, and 
effluent toxic substances were violently emitted in dense fountains. The emissions formed a thick 
layer over the surface of the adjoining land, destroying farmland, crops, and economic trees and 
natural vegetation of the impacted areas with the resultant desertification of the impacted area of 
about 1,500 acres [belonging to several families] in K-Dere town.'260 
The high-pressure pipeline networks snaking over Ogoni farmland and across people's 
homes have made land that was once used for agricultural purposes economically useless. 
In addition, in 1993, when Shell pulled out of Ogoniland, the bulk of the pipelines were 
overdue and corroded, increasing the risk ofleaks?61 
Although the environmental damage described here caused physical harm, the violence 
that was inflicted on the Ogoni population was of a structural nature as wel1.262 It can be 
debated whether the political marginalisation of the Ogonis has been exaggerated, 
especially when compared to the position -and often exclusion- of other Niger Delta 
groups in public office on the state and the local, even the national level. Osaghae 
observes that their grievance needs to be examined against the background of the 
expectation harboured by the Ogoni elites 'that their oil-producing status entitles them to 
a greater share of state power. ,263 
In 1990 a group of Ogoni community leaders from the six Ogoni clans, one of which was 
writer, activist, and former state government official Ken Saro-Wiwa, established the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). They presented the Ogoni 
Bill of Rights (OBR), adopted two months earlier, demanding among other things: 'The 
right of the Ogoni people to self-determination as a distinct people in the Nigerian 
Federation; adequate representation as a right in all Nigerian institutions; the right to use 
a fair proportion of the economic resources in Ogoniland for its development; and the 
right to control their environment.' The OBR declared the non-violent stance of 
MOSOP.264 
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The OBR did not cause as much as a ripple in the national politics, and received but a 
brief mention in the Rivers State newspapers. In November 1992 however, MOSOP 
issued a thirty-day ultimatum addressed to Shell to pay back-rents, royalties and 
compensation for damages done over the past thrity something years, or leave the land. 
Other demands mentioned in the memorandum were that all high-pressure pipelines 
currently lying exposed in Ogoniland be buried underground, and that active steps were 
taken to establish dialogue between community representatives, Shell, and the federal 
government. 265 
This time, MOSOP had made sure that their protest would not go unnoticed. A simple but 
efficient project of mass mobilisation, launched shortly after the declaration of the OBR 
two years earlier, had involved nearly every Ogoni, young and old, man and women, in 
the struggle. To ensure that MOSOP had a truly democratic, grassroots base its leadership 
had formed and facilitated a plethora of sub-organisations of which MOSOP remained 
the umbrella. Organisations such as the National Youth Council of Ogoni People 
(NYCOP), Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA), Conference of Ogoni 
Traditional Rulers (COTRA), Council of Ogoni Churches (COC), Ogoni Teachers Union 
(OTU) and Ogoni Students Union (OSU) are but a few examples. These organisations 
were aimed at strengthening MOSOP, and simultaneously providing platforms for 
participation, dialogue and decision-making.266 Saro-Wiwa's supporters were mostly 
within NYCOP, of which he was president.267 
The division and growing opposition between the conservative elders within MOSOP and 
the radical youths of NYCOP was a manifestation of the generational shift of power 
towards the youth that has been described earlier in this paper, and the subsequent decline 
of the 'moral authority of the gerontocrats.' Obi adds to these developments the gaining 
265 I. Okonta and O. Douglas, Where vultures feast: 117. 
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of prominence of women groups. The role that this gender profile plays in the Niger 
O I I . "fi 268 e ta strugg e IS slgm Icant. 
MOSOP, through its grassroots sub-movements, managed to mobilise some 300.000 
Ogoni for a formidable peaceful protest in January 1993 against the continued denial of 
their rights by both Shell and the Nigerian government. The protest, cleverly planned to 
coincide with the opening of the United Nations Year of Indigenous Peoples, took place 
without a single incident of violence, and marked a turning point in the MOSOP 
campaign. Having finally raised attention on a national scale, the MOSOP leaders were 
invited by General Babangida for 'dialogue'. This turned out to be no more than an 
attempt to frighten the MOSOP leaders by intimidation into giving up their activities.269 
After some violent confrontations involving Shell staff and local farmers, which left one 
young Ogoni dead and eleven others injured, Shell pulled out from Ogoniland. The 
MOSOP leaders were again invited to Abuja. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Dr. G.B. Leton, A.T. 
Badey and Chief E.N. Kobani represented the Ogoni case, but again, the conference 
turned out to be a stooge.270 It was Kobani and Leton who accused Saro-Wiwa of 
personalisation of the MOSOP agenda, taking over its decision-making process and using 
NYCOP as his private army.271 Leton became the leader of a faction within MOSOP that 
tried to restructure the organisation while Saro-Wiwa was detained along with two other 
MOSOP activists on the basis of the new Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree. 
Leton's suggestion was that MOSOP cease to be an umbrella organisation for the sub-
groups such as NYCOP and COTRA. He was out-voted. One interesting feature in the 
MOSOP decision-making structure that demonstrates the disfranchisement of the chiefs 
is that, although traditional political institutions have a place in MOSOP, the chiefs had 
only three votes out oftwenty-seven.272 
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Internal opposition came to a head in the run-up to the 1993 elections, which MOSOP 
had pledged to boycott. When the same Dr. Leton and Chief Kobani tried to subvert the 
decision of the Steering Committee to boycott the elections, and failed, they resigned 
from their positions as president and vice-president of MOSOP. In July 1993, Saro-Wiwa 
was elected president in absentia by the Steering Committee.273 The schism between 
some of the Ogoni elders and the radical youths would not diminish. The conservatives, 
who were defeated by the young radicals' control over the grassroots, responded by 
strengthening their alliances with the state and the TOCs, and attempted to expose Saro-
Wiwa as a radical and an agitator.274 
Around this time sudden and inexplicable attacks were visited on Ogoni by their 
neighbouring communities, the Andoni, Okrika, and Ndoki, with whom they had always 
maintained good relations. There is evidence that the inter-community violence was 
provoked by state-agents to stifle the agitation against the state and Shell. Some say this 
violence was sponsored by Shell. It was certainly tolerated by the oil giant that was 
hoping to reassume its operations in Ogoniland sooner, rather than later. The increased 
insecurity and pervasive fear led to the establishment of local vigilante groups to offer 
protection to the besieged communities.275 
The military crackdown on the Ogoni communities took an unprecedented form after four 
MOSOP leaders, among whom Chief Kobani and Chief Badey, were murdered by an 
angry mob. The circumstances of the murders were extremely shady, and although Saro-
Wiwa was nowhere near the place of the crime, he was apprehended that same evening. 
While Saro-Wiwa was tried before a kangaroo tribunal and sentenced to death, hell 
descended on Ogoniland. Villages were raided and thousands of Ogoni men, women and 
children were slaughtered by the Nigerian Armed Forces, while the area was cordoned 
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off from the media.276 Thousands more were raped, tortured, robbed and extorted, turned 
into refugees and detained in detention centres that were opened especially for this 
operation. On ] 0 November ] 995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others who had been found 
guilty of the murders of the four Ogoni chiefs were hanged. 
Obi asserts that, instead of silencing the other ethnic minority movements, the beheading 
of MOSOP propelled 'another change of form in the protest movement, the rise of the 
militant Ijaw movement and an escalation in the intensity [ .. ] of the pan-delta quest to end 
internal colonisation, personal rule and the federal expropriation of the oil resources of 
the Niger Delta.,277 
4.5. Emergence oflye 
Presumedly, the federal government and TOe's lack of response to the peaceful protest 
of oil-producing communities, followed by brutal violence, hardened the activists and 
instigated the emergence of movements with a broader agenda demanding democratic 
development and self-determination.278 
In comparison with MOSOP's sophisticated structure, lye has been described as 'loosely 
organised and weakly accountable, right from the beginning, both upwards and 
downwards, which made it easy for potent forces to buy themselves in and capture the 
organisation. ,279 Whether the latter is true remains to be seen, but with the 
conglomeration of numerous youth groups under its umbrella, lye has tended to 'lose 
control.' Actions that have been ascribed to the lye tum out not to have been related to 
the lye at all, like the killing of twelve policemen in Odi, which sparked a brutal state 
reaction and the destruction of the village?80 The elusiveness of the Ijaw uprising and 
particularly the lye in comparison with MOSOP have been linked to the difference in 
the physical sites of the two struggles. The Ogoni territory is relatively easily accessible, 
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land-based and the Ogoni people do not live dispersed over six states as the Ijaws do. 
Ijawland, on the other hand, is predominantly riverine, with 'thick mangroves, swampy 
areas and poorly demarcated creeks and rivers that serve as strong barriers to effective 
policing. ,281 
One of the first movements that were established in the wake of MOSOP in 1992 was the 
Ijaw-based Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND). 
MOSIEND issued a charter based loosely on the OBR, in which they called for political 
autonomy for the Ijaw nation, restructuring of the Nigerian Federation, control over their 
own natural resources and adequate compensation for ecological adversities suffered as a 
result of oil exploration and production. In 1994 MOSIEND 'joined forces with' the Ijaw 
National Congress (INC), to further pursue its objectives through non-violent means. The 
INC is the umbrella organisation for all Ijaw speaking people in Nigeria.282 
The impact of MOSIEND and a fleet of other ethnic, pan-ethnic, social, environmental, 
political, non-violent, militant, one-issue and multiple-issue groups that arose in the Niger 
Delta in the next few years came nowhere near what the IYC would soon bring about. 
According to Okonta and Douglas, the junta of Sani Abacha faced 'an increasingly 
restive Niger Delta, and the emergence of a new generation of educated youths who were 
now not only openly challenging corrupt chiefs and community leaders, but were also 
successfully mobilizing their communities to resist the oil companies[.],283 
This is said to have motivated Abacha to establish a new security outfit named Operation 
Salvage in August 1997 to, purportedly, 'tame the youths in Bayelsa State. ,284 At about 
the same time, in Rivers State the military administrator there set up Operation Flush, 
declaring that he had obtained 'special emergency powers from Aso Rock [government 
281 C. Ukeje, 'Oil communities and political violence': 26. 
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HQ in Abuja] to deal "ruthlessly with economic saboteurs".,285 In April 1998 details 
leaked about a massive military operation being prepared by the junta to establish a new 
National Coastal Guard, 'comprising the army, navy, air force, antiriot police, and 
customs, to ensure uninterrupted economic activities" In the oil-producing 
communities. ,286 
lkelegbe notes that the persistent repressive, insensitive, non-responsive, arrogant 
character of the state that, even after the transition to democratic rule, was agitated 
merely by force or the threat of force, has contributed greatly to the development of 
violent tendencies of civil society groups in the Niger Delta.287 The history of the 
emergence and the transformation of the IYC exemplify this view. The lYC is also an 
example of a movement that descended into criminality and violent confrontation because 
it could not exercise firm control and leadership over its members. Another view is that 
these were merely expressions of grievances and frustrations as a result of injustice, 
oppression, marginalisation and inequity 'by groups in a federation that has been 
anything but fair. ,288 
The Ijaw nation is the largest ethnic minority group in Nigeria. With a count of two 
million people, they are by far the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta. The bulk of the 
ljaw live in Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta States, but they also inhabit non-coastal states such 
as Akwa Ibom, Cross-Rivers, and Edo. More than half of Shell's crude oil output in the 
Niger Delta is extracted from Ijawland.289 
The military build-up for Operations Salvage and Flush was interrupted for some time 
after the sudden death of General Abacha in June 1998. But once his successor, General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, took office in November of that year he immediately resumed 
equipping the navy and the army for a major offensive on the short term. 
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The Ijaw youths did not wait for the imminent crack-down. On 11 December 1998 over 
five thousand youths, drawn from all five hundred communities and forty clans that make 
up the Ijaw nation, gathered in Kaiama. The conference had chosen this particular site for 
its location in reverence of the first Ijaw revolutionary, Isaac Adaka Boro, who had 
launched an unsuccessful uprising against the Nigerian federation in 1966 shortly before 
the breakout of the Biafra War.290 The gathering adopted the Kaiama Declaration, which 
presented an ultimatum for all oil companies to leave the Niger Delta by 30 December 
1998, or it would eject the TOCs and take control of all oil wells in Ijawland?91 
The Kaiama Declaration is said to contain the 'essence of Ijaw nationalism.,292 It 
proclaimed that all land and natural resources in Ijawland belong to the Ijaw communities 
and are the basis of their survival. It ceases to recognise all undemocratic decrees, such as 
the Land Use Decree of 1976 and the Petroleum Tax Decree of 1969 that 'robbed our 
communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were 
enacted without our participation and consent.,293 Another demand was the immediate 
withdrawal of 'all military forces of occupation and repression' from Ijawland, and 
further that '[a]ny oil company that employs the services of the armed forces to "protect" 
its operations will be reviewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. ,294 
Like the Ogoni the Ijaws had started agitating against the neglect and abuse of their 
people and land long before the 1990s brought matters to a head. Between the 1970s and 
the late 1980s protests had taken the form of non-violent public demonstrations, petitions, 
advertisements in national newspapers, litigation in the courts and sending community 
delegations to TOCs, state and federal government.295 Obviously, the results of these 
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were unsatisfactory. Starting in the 1990s protests assumed a more militant form and 
hostage-takings of TOC employees, occupation, disruption and vandalisation of oil 
installations began to OCCUr.296 
The IYC is said to be a break-away movement from the mainstream, more conservative 
INC that had been using the same ineffectual approaches to advocate Ijaw rights for 
decades. As is the case with other movements, intergenerational tension is apparent in the 
IYC relationship with the INC.297 The agenda of INC had long been focused on the 
creation of a state for the Ijaws, who were 'passed by' during the splurges of the 80s and 
90S.298 When Bayelsa State was finally established, the INC lost much of its urgency, 
although until this day it continues to press for yet more Ijaw states.299 But the INC 
supported the youths, who presented themselves as the radical wing of Ijaw nationalism 
and an alternative to the conservative INC.300 Certain INC cadres must have felt that the 
non-violent avenues chosen by the INC had been exhausted.30' Although the Kaiama 
ultimatum was temporarily suspended after pleas from elders and other 'well-meaning 
Nigerians', and the Declaration moulded into a declaration of intent, violent actions 
across the Niger Delta by various ethnic Ijaw organisations has since then increased 
exponentially.302 Eberlein mentions the 'rise and consequent co-optation of the IYC by 
actors within Rivers and Bayelsa State administrations.'303 Moreover, it has continued to 
constitute a problem for the leadership of IYC to control its highly diversified 
membership.304 
It is important to bear in mind that, whatever the transformation of the struggle after the 
issuing of the Kaiama Declaration, its official stance was fundamentally non-violent. On 
December 28 the IYC unfolded its plans for Operation Climate Change. This constituted 
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a series of non-violent actions, starting with the 'Ogele', a traditional Ijaw dance where 
the spirits of the ancestors are invoked through song, stories and mime to cleanse the 
land, chastise the erring and heal the injured, which was to take place all over Ijawland 
for ten consecutive days in an atmosphere of joy, drink, and hope. The Ogele was meant 
to raise environmental awareness among the Ijaw nation and, rather than to provoke the 
government and TOCs, it was aimed to celebrate a period of regeneration and cleansing 
as a people.305 This was not how the military authorities saw it. Okonta and Douglas 
recount: 
'On the morning of December 30, the day marked by the Kaiama Declaration as the 
commencement of activities to implement its resolutions, young women and men all over the Ijaw 
nation trooped out to the streets and village squares in the thousands to dance and sing and voice 
out their grievances. They were not armed. They were not violent. They did not molest anybody. 
In a letter dispatched to all Ijaw villages and clans on December 28, the [IYC] had emphasized the 
need for participants in the Ogele/Operation Climate Change festivities, to be peaceful, courteous, 
and orderly. This was obeyed to the letter. ,)06 
In the meantime, firepower of an unprecedented size was being ranged on Yenagoa, the 
capital of Bayelsa and the heart of Ijawland.307 What followed was a 'wanton slaughter of 
unarmed dancers. ,J08 By the end of the day on 30 December Kaiama, Yen ago a, Odi, and 
Oloibiri were razed and, according to Human Rights Watch estimates, more than 200 
people from these towns and nearby communities had been killed, and many more driven 
into the swamps.309 Soldiers set out on a rampage, looting, raping and molesting 
whomever they came across. The campaign of violence and death by the federal troops 
continued for days. In several instances there was active involvement of TOCs in the 
massacres, which offered helicopters and other resources for military expeditions.310 The 
crackdown on the Ijaw nation left many communities destroyed, traumatised, and utterly 
resentful of a state that had revealed itself irrevocably as an enemy of its own people. 
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According to Sesay et al. the Egbesu Boys of Africa are the fighting ann of the IYC. The 
IYC is claimed to coordinate all Ijaw groups in the Niger Delta, and not, as Okonta and 
Douglas state, the INC.311 The creation of the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) was a 
measure of defiance and growing militancy against the reign of terror that was unleashed 
on the Ijaws, and the militarization of the Niger Delta region. Sesay et al. argue that the 
consistent military pacification as the government response to all agitation,in the region is 
what gave birth to the plethora of militant groups currently active in the Niger Delta.312 
During the military attacks in January 1999, the Egbesu Boys stonned military 
checkpoints and posts in Kaiama, Yenagoa and on the express road, and they sacked 
police stations in Kaiama and in Odi.313 
Three weeks into January 1998 the IYC announced that Operation Climate Change would 
be indefinitely extended.314 The anarchic (or utterly democratic?) character of the Ijaw 
struggle was complete, or so it appears. Has the struggle for justice among the Ijaw 
youths morphed into a bush fire of seemingly autonomous youth actions, violent 
incidents and confrontations, hostage-takings and intimidations?315 Or have the 'vibrant 
mass-based movements' of the 1990s that were shaped from previously amorphous 
groups begun to acquire 'politically visible organisational structures [?]'316 To what 
degree there was structure and organisation present in the militia at the time is not 
entirely certain. The leadership of the EBA is derived from different Ijaw organisations 
and communities. The assembly of this leadership, the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA) 
is headed by the Egbesu chief priest, who administers initiation rituals, spiritual 
fortification and communication with the Ijaw deity: Egbesu.317 
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In 1998 the executive of the EBA comprised the chief priest Alex Preye, flanked by Felix 
Tuodolor as general secretary, F. Denumighan as director of mobilization, Clayton 
Daunumingnan as director of finance, Ambah Binaebi as director of environmental 
affairs, and Patrick Ziakede as director of public relations. The SEA was chaired by 
Sergeant Were Digifa. Former president of MOSIEND Timi Ogoruba was general 
secretary for some time, and Felix Tuodolor later became president of the Iyc.318 
Although Sesay et al. note that it is difficult to assign specific actions to the EBA because 
its members are active in different militant organisations simultaneously, they continue to 
list a range of incidents and confrontations in which the EBA were purportedly 
implicated.319 The EBA are said to have been the fighters in the ltsekiri-Ijaw conflicts in 
Delta State in 1997-1999, the Ijaw-Ilaje conflicts in Ondo State in 1998-2000 and from 
2002 onwards, and the IYC-OPC clashes in Ajegunle suburb in Lagos in 2002. 
Moreover, they get ascribed to them '[m]ost of the seizures and takeovers, occupation of 
oil installations (sic), kidnapping of oil workers, hijacking of oil facilities, as well as 
bloody encounters with state security agencies in many parts of the Niger Delta have 
been traced to the Egbesu Boys in different militant movements in Ijawland.,32o 
Ijaws have complained that they are being singled out and stigmatised as being members 
of the 'most violent, most militant uprising in the Niger Delta. The short-lived leadership 
of Asari Dokubo at the IYC has had far-reaching consequences for the organisation. The 
year 2001 is regarded as a break in the character and focus of the IYC. Allegedly, 
governor Peter Odili financed the rise of his close friend Asari Dokubo to the IYC 
presidency. 'What started as a militant socio-economic movement was transformed into a 
'private security outfit of actors within the Rivers State government.,321 Felix Tuodolor, 
who had been IYC president before Asari's election challenged his vote, which resulted 
in a brief but violent stand-off.322 Asari was too radical for the moderates in the IYC, who 
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tried to remove him from the organisation. After the 2003 elections Asari Dokubo and 
Odili fell out, and the former declared war on his former patron.323 
When president Obasanjo offered him and the NDV leader Tom Ateke an amnesty deal 
in exchange for their disarmament, Asari accepted. Although the militia leader denied 
having made a profit from the deal, Obasanjo allegedly paid $1,000 for every rifle and 
$10,000 for each machine gun handed in. Whatever the truth of this may be, Asari moved 
in to a comfortable villa in Port Harcourt and bought a couple of SUVs shortly after he 
signed the peace agreement. He has been accused of using the struggle to enrich himself 
with payments from both government and TOCs.324 
Because he would not refrain from his separatist struggle, repeatedly making public 
statements about the imminence of secession, if the Nigerian government would not 
allow a National Sovereign Conference to debate the future of the nation, a demand that 
has been issued by almost all ethno-political groups in and outside the Niger Delta from 
the early 1990s onward, Asari was arrested in 2005. Despite his amnesty deal he was 
charged with treason, conspiracy and unlawful assembly.325 
The elusiveness of Ijaw nationalism is partly due to the geography of Ijawland. Very 
different from Ogoniland ljawland is spread over six states, large parts of which, 
especially in Bayelsa State, are poorly accessible, tucked away in a maze of thick 
mangroves, swamps, creeks and rivers.326 More than geography, it is the structure of the 
lYC and its central position in a web of militant and non-violent, social, environmental, 
human rights and other organisations, that makes it so difficult to pin down. The overlap 
of membership with some of these groups, and the impression that the lYC network 
exists as a 'militant wing', in the form of the EBA, a 'scientific wing' and an 'intellectual 
wing' in the form of Environmental Rights Action (ERA) and the Niger Delta-Human 
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and Environmental Rights Organisation (ND-HERO)327, basically means that the 
conceptualisation of IYC as an organisation as such is useless. 
The IYC is administered by a collegiate body, a national executive and a zonal executive 
in the east, west and centre of the Niger Delta.328 In 2001 its leadership was collegiate 
made up of the leaders of the IYC satellites. These were at the time: Felix Tuodolor, 
Oronta Douglas, Bedford Abuele, Valentine Kuku, Roland Oweinanabo.329 
Militant affiliates to IYC that are mentioned by Sesay et al. are: MOSIEND, FNDIC, 
NIDOPCODO, the Niger Delta Resistance Movement and the Membutu BoYS.330 The 
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) is named by Sesay et al. as one of the 
main armed wings of the lYe. It is known to have been involved in insurgency, seizure 
of oil installations and violent confrontations with State security agencies. They have 
close ties with the EBA and its leader, Asari Dokubo, rests in detention. 33l The release of 
their leader is one recurring demand that 'kidnapping groups' in the Niger Delta make to 
the government. 
4.6. MEND 
The emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is 
closely linked with both IYC and the likes of NDPVF. It is the latest and the most 
impressive of the new militant movements that mushroomed in the Niger Delta after the 
tum of the millennium. The first actions of MEND occurred in January 2006 when 
militants attacked an offshore Shell facility, firing at Nigerian soldiers who were guarding 
the installation, and kidnapping four foreign contractors. That same day, a Shell pipeline 
was blown Up.332 Some days later, an attack on a Shell flow station in Benisede in 
Bayelsa State killed fourteen soldiers and two foreign contract workers and was claimed 
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by MEND, stating that it was a response to a shooting by soldiers at a community protest 
h . 333 t e prevIOus year. 
Others have suggested that the arrests of Bayelsa State governor, Alamieyeseigha, and 
Asari-Dokubo has led to a new phase in the Niger Delta struggle, and the beginning of a 
low-level war.334 Alamieyeseigha was arrested, impeached and imprisoned on charges of 
money laundering in September 2005. The immediate release of Alamieyeseigha and 
Asari-Dokubo has been a constantly recurring demand of MEND and many of the new-
wave militias that have become active in its wake.335 The emergence of MEND has been 
suggested by some to be a direct response to the arrests and an attempt of the governor's 
hired thugs to force the release of their 'godfather.' But others have an entirely different 
view of the nature and the origins of MEND, and blame all other impressions on 
'impersonators' riding on the back of the socially engaged MEND, looking for some 
profit. 336 
More attacks and counterattacks followed, bringing the MEND militants into violent 
encounters with the military, and at the forefront of the militant struggle against the 
'state-oil multinationals alliance.,337 The military has performed air strikes on Ijaw 
villages where MEND militants were supposedly hiding. Two car bombings, the first 
ever in the history of Nigerian politics, have so far been carried out by MEND, although 
it has refuted the claim for responsibility of one ofthese.338 One popular tactic of MEND 
is the kidnapping of expatriate staff of oil companies and sub-contractors. This, combined 
with being extremely savvy when it comes to gearing publicity and manipulating mass 
media,339 has not only brought MEND into the centre of the Nigerian public eye, but put 
it into a position where it could impact global oil price fluctuations by its actions, even 
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merely by its threats.34o Under the pseudonym of its spokesman, John Gbomo, MEND 
sends e-mails to journalists informing them about imminent attacks on pipelines, 
kidnappings and releases of expatriates, sometimes accompanied by visual material.341 
The degree of cooperation with other militant organisations is difficult to establish. 
MEND too has demanded the release of Dokubo Asari, but Gbomo emphasised that the 
relationship with the NDPVF is one of collaboration and influence, not of authority. 
According to ICG, MEND tries to position itself as an umbrella group for the militants in 
the region, but Gbomo says that MEND does not take in just anybody as a member. 
Militants who fight for MEND cannot be of 'dubious character. ,342 Yet, outsiders who 
perform operations that contribute to the MEND cause can usually count on the 
organisation's approval. Gbomo comments that: 
'In any struggle there are bound to be several version as seen through the eyes of different 
participants. Some are fighting for a car, some for pride, some for a job or even food to eat; the 
more ambitious the hope that they may someday be governors, or local government chairmen, 
legislators etc in new states. This is normal. In the United States or Canada, what percentage 
agrees with government policies? These individuals for now are as leaves adrift and will go where 
we take them. For them, anywhere is better than here. ,343 
ICG interviewed another militant who offered insight into the current structure of 
command for militant action in the Niger Delta. The informant, a former member of 
NDPVF, explained that since Asari's arrest, militants had organised themselves in cells 
of five to fifteen people, with limited communication between the cells. The cells are 
quite free to carry out operations in the manner that they prefer. Some of the more radical 
cells leaned toward executing expatriate oil staff, as a next step in the campaign.344 
After the arrest of Asari, most of the militant movements in the Niger Delta went 
underground, including MEND. Publicity is still being used as a tool to generate attention 
for the oil-producing communities' plight and to intimidate the state-oil multinational 
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alliance, but the organisations' leaders no longer venture out in public. Infiltration by 
government agents has been a concurrent fact, but the decentralised nature of the 
movements has kept this strategy reasonably in check. One militant leader commented: 
'our disunity is our strength', confirming that if the militant groups of the Niger Delta 
were united, they would probably have been destroyed by now. 345 
Gbomo compared the structure of the militant groups to a hydra, the mythological Greek 
serpent with many heads, which, when one was cut off, would grow two back.346 This 
visualisation of MEND is akin to the interpretation of Okonta when he asserts that this 
movement is not so much an organisation, as it is an idea, 'a general principle underlying 
the slew of communal, civic and youth movements that began to proliferate in the Niger 
Delta, and particularly in the Ijaw-speaking areas, in the wake of General Babangida's 
failed structural adjustment policies in the late I 980s. ,347 
The consequences of the SAP were felt severely in the Niger Delta regIon. Lacking 
government jobs in the first place, and the only industry present being the capital-
intensive oil industry, thousands of Ijaws who had been retrenched from their jobs in the 
cities and towns began to stream back to their homes in the swamps of the Niger Delta.348 
Many of these youths were educated, and politically knowledgeable. They would become 
the driving force of a new insurgency in the Niger Delta. Obi has described the ways in 
which the youth, after economic crisis and structural adjustment, lost confidence in their 
elders and traditional rulers. Most of them are educated, with high school diplomas and 
university degrees. Yet they remain unemployed. Those without education are even 
worse off, because there is little farmland and fishing has become a high cost/risk venture 
that most cannot afford. 349 
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Contributing to the amorphous militancy of the Niger Delta have been the possibilities 
offered by modem ICT. The use of cell phones, satellite television and internet has 
broadened the possibilities of communication and cooperation between militants and 
other groups in remote areas, heightened their awareness of what the impact of their 
actions could be on the global stage, and opened new avenues to involve Nigerians and 
the global community in what is happening in the Niger Delta.350 On the other hand, the 
ICT revolution has not passed the government by either. Cell phone signals can be pin-
pointed accurately with electronic devices, making the MEND leadership extremely 
cautious in using them.351 
The militancy of MEND and its violent, even if calculated, tactics cannot be denied. 
However, the leadership makes it clear that its involvement in criminal activities is 
marginal. Oil bunkering is something that only a minority of their membership has 
'drifted into,' and some have offered protection services for corrupt politicians and oil 
companies.352 MEND hostages have never been harmed, or so they claim, and although 
the government claims that hostages' release has often been in exchange for ransom, and 
not, as the explicit political stance of MEND would have it, for concessions of a social 
kind, the objective of hostage-taking is said to be 'fundamentally political', as it focuses 
the attention of western media on the grievances of the oil communities.353 MEND does 
not prioritise a non-violent approach, but armed force is regarded as merely a tactical 
tool.354 In February 2006 its violent actions reduced Nigeria's oil output by 25 percent.355 
Okonta asserts that the military helicopter attack on Okerenkoko in Gbaramatu kingdom, 
purportedly aimed at stamping out an 'oil-bunkering epicentre', and that killed several 
innocent civilians, induced the creation of MEND.356 But this attack took place one 
month after the first MEND operations in January 2006. But this is not to argue that the 
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MEND insurgency was unprovoked, but from the previous it becomes clear that its 
nascence is not as readily accounted for as was the case with lye and MOSOP. Like 
lye, MEND is an Ijaw movement. It perceives its birth to be a direct roll-out of the 
Adaka Boro revolution of 1966.357 The youths' disdain for their traditional leaders, who, 
in their perception, 'sold out' the Niger Delta communities to the TOes and the federal 
government in exchange for benefits and power, was a catalyst for the movement's 
. . 358 InceptIOn. 
The founding core of the MEND membership comes from the Gbaramatu clan, states 
Okonta, who at the same time emphasises that MEND is not a formal organisation with a 
clear membership structure, or a chain of command.359 Okonta confirms what was 
concluded by the leG that MEND operates as a loose coalition of separate units, which 
basically make their own decisions. 
The inception of MEND appears to have merged with its first activities, the attacks at 
Benisede flow-station and the hostage-taking of four expatriate staff-members.36o 
According to Okonta, a key grievance of MEND is the exclusion of Ijaws from political 
participation since the instalment of the democratic regime of Obasanjo in 1999.361 But 
Tell Magazine states that the four major demands of MEND, which were issued during 
one of the early episodes of hostage-takings, must have been 'contrived to be rejected'. 
These were the release of Dokubo Asari and Alamieyesiagha; an increase in the 
derivation formula of 25 percent that year and 20 percent the following years annually 
until the Niger Delta states have complete resource control; and finally, that Shell should 
pay the $1,5 billion in reparations for 50 years' environmental violence against Ijaw 
communities, which it was summoned to pay by a Port Harcourt high court.362 A 
Vanguard article went as far as to posit that the main drive of the MEND agitation is the 
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release from prIson of Alamieyesiagha, who was allegedly their 'godfather'. 'It is 
suspected that the group included Asari-Dokobo and the agitation for resource control to 
give their terror campaign a semblance of acceptance by Niger-Deltans but that has not 
worked so far in the minds of many.' 363 
The same article expresses severe doubt about the identity of the militant group that 
emerged in Bayelsa State. 'A leader of an Ijaw group contacted [ .. ] Saturday [by] 
Vanguard said that the boys are known as Bushmen and expressed surprise that they 
identified themselves with the new name of MEND.' The confusion is portrayed by the 
article as an attempt of MEND to mask its private interests in the local conflict economy 
with a broader, but flimsy social agenda. 'It is a product of some careful planning by the 
bunch of hooligans. The gameplan is to make it look as if the trouble is a Niger-Delta 
affair. They started from Rivers State before retreating to the creeks of Bayelsa where 
they are 10rds.,364 
If this was the case in January 2006, it seems that what happened in the course of the next 
few months was a classic example of a criminal gang turning into a rebel movement. 
Another, perhaps more useful, scenario is that ljaw activists retroactively appropriated the 
activities of this independent cell of the struggle as they caught the attention of the world. 
MEND, in this vision, is not just an idea, but a construct, contrived from a convergence 
of circumstances. This, of course, is only viable if the allegations in the quoted article are 
true. 
Even if the sources that the authors of the article claim to have spoken with are real, it is 
difficult, if not impossible to establish whether they spoke the truth. The problem with a 
movement that is structured as a hydra is that there is no way to assess which of its 
elements is really part of the movements and which is a 'fluke'. On the other hand, as 
long as the response of the government remains to ignore their demands, or to call in the 
363 E. Amaize, 'Killings, kidnap in Niger Delta. Villagers flee en masse from troubled spots as pressures 
mount over abducted foreigners', Vanguard (Lagos: 21 January 2006). 











armed forces, it does not matter much. It only becomes a handicap when negotiations are 
imminent. 
In October 2006 an attempt to initiate dialogue with the militant groups of the Niger 
Delta was finally made by the government. Forty representatives from groups in Delta, 
Bayelsa and Rivers States participated in a three-day brainstorming session in Delta State 
with top government officials and peace groups. The focus of the brainstorming session 
was how to resolve the Niger Delta crisis in general, and to bring an end to the wave of 
hostage-takings in the region in particular.365 
In November, another meeting was convened in Bayelsa State, this time between the 
Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Owoye Andrew Azazi, and militant youths. 
Azazi commented to Vanguard that this intervention was required due to 'the increasing 
level of crimes in the region committed under the guise of fighting for the Niger 
Delta.,366 Some of the youths who were present at the convention subscribed to that 
viewpoint, conceding that '[the] continued incarceration [of Dokubo Asari] had given 
room for all kinds of crimes to be committed in the region under the guise of seeking his 
release. They expressed hope that the release would bring an end to hostilities in the 
region.'367 As dialogue was taking place, attacks continued to occur on flow stations in 
Bayelsa State, and several expatriate oil workers were kidnapped. A certain Joint 
Revolutionary Council (JRC) issued a statement, saying that they would continue to 
commit and endorse violent actions until Dokubo Asari is released from prison. 
'We have thus far allowed those who conspired to keep Dokubo-Asari injail roam around our 
states and region peacefully. We have allowed them to dream up high political challenges. It shall 
come to pass that our anger will no longer be directed at the oil and gas companies. [ ... ] Desperate 
situations demand desperate measures. At this point, we lack the ability to maintain restraint [.],368 
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4.7. A process of transformation 
The emergence of militia movements in the Niger Delta cannot be regarded as a linear 
process. The multi-dimensional structure of the organisations and their mutual external 
linkages, with members that are committed to more than one organisation at the same 
time, and a continuous regeneration of groups, show that it is impossible to attribute a 
certain action, or a series of actions, to one particular movement. The ongoing 
transformations of the movements reflect the contradictions and factions within the 
movements: elders versus youths, democracy versus dictatorship, conservative versus 
radical. However, as Obi notes, these contradictions are fluid because they do not 
preclude alliances across the trenches when the situation requires. Issues that bring all the 
movements together are 'the increased share in oil revenues, repeal of exploitative laws, 
bigger compensation for oil pollution, development for the Niger delta, employment and 
provision of good social welfare.'369 For the same reason, it is difficult to ascribe a 
violent, non-violent or predatory nature to either one of the movements. Like MEND, and 
even lye, they can be both violent and non-violent at the same time. Because the ethnic 
militia movements are part of networks in which different cells, groups and movements 
take up different facets of the struggle, and use varying means to achieve their goals, their 
approach does not necessarily conform to a set of principles proclaimed by any 'umbrella 
movement.' Although MEND advertises itself as an umbrella organisation, this does not 
counteract the ambiguity of its own nature and the circumstances of its nascence. 
The role of leadership should not be underestimated. When the battle over the lye 
presidency broke out between Dokubo Asari and Tuodolor in 2001, it was the nature of 
lye - Asari's radicalism, including an inclination toward separatism versus Tuodolor's 
more moderate stance - that was at stake.37o The execution of Saro-Wiwa, in addition to 
the persistent obliteration of the Ogoni civil society and social infrastructure by the 
pacification tactics of the government, brought MOSOP to near expiration. It continues to 
press for economic and political reforms, but it has lost most of its strength and 
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international leverage.37 ] The internal disagreements between Saro-Wiwa and more 
moderate figures in the movement's cadres about the degree of radicalism that MOSOP 
should support have not been resolved. The internal dispute was decided by the 
government's heavy-handed intervention. MOSOP is seen until this day as the proto-
ethnic militia movement in the Niger Delta.372 But its non-violent stance sets it far apart 
from most of the movements that followed in its wake. 3?3 
4.8. Conclusion: the development nexus 
As organisations especially, IYC and MEND are not distinct, autonomous entities. They 
are part of networks and allegiances of organizations and movements, and they are 
internally fragmented. Even MOSOP functions as an umbrella for a variety of sub-
organisations, contributing to the struggle through diverging means - peaceful, political 
and civil advocacy, militant and violent. IYC and MEND's apparent lack of official 
membership further complicates matters with regard to constituency and 'ownership' of 
activities. 
An interesting demand of MEND, in addition to the adaptation of the derivation formula 
so that 25-50 percent of oil revenue will be assigned to the oil-producing communities, is 
that these funds should be channelled through foundations in control of people from the 
community to prevent the money from disappearing in the process.3?4 For Collier and 
Hoeffler, there is no problem in paying the money that would come from a serious 
increase in the percentage of the derivation formula directly to Bayelsa State. More 
money in the state budget means, for Collier and Hoeffier, more money for development, 
which is deemed to be primarily an economic affair. From economic development would 
automatically follow economic growth and this in tum creates circumstances adverse to 
rebellion. But Galtung explains that class cleavages - and thus unequal distribution - are 
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tied in the social structure. Structural violence will only end when there is social justice 
for the people of the Niger Delta. 375 
Ake holds a similar view. He argues that development is connected to peace because it 
provides an environment in which people can strive for their self-realisation.376 Economic 
growth does not necessarily mean a rise in all people's incomes, nor is it synonymous 
with equality and social justice. Ake was more concerned with social and economic rights 
that are the dividend of development and democratisation, while Collier considers that the 
latter might even increase the risk of armed rebellion.377 
While Collier and Hoeffler are mainly concerned with economic development as a cure 
for the emergence of rebel movements, Burton focuses rather on human development. All 
the grievances, or needs, that have come forward in this chapter, be they environmental 
justice, a more favourable outcome of the revenue derivation formula, protection of land 
rights, opportunities for employment or general security, pertain to the current situation 
of unequal distribution of power. 
Collier and Hoeffler might not disagree with the conclusion that a struggle for self-
determination is at hand in the Niger Delta, but they would differ with Burton about what 
caused it, or, as they prefer to put it, what were the factors that made the rebels take up 
arms in the first place to claim their right to self-determination. The proxies that they 
name are only partly present in the Niger Delta. There is a dependency on natural 
resources, but not so much on donations from a diaspora. Subventions from hostile 
governments also seem to be a source of financing for the Niger Delta ethnic militia 
movements. However, the income derived from illegal bunkering is a good substitute for 
those two 'missing' sources of income. Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler do not mention 
the funds that can be, and in the Niger Delta are certainly being gathered from state 
politicians in exchange for election muscle. Another source of income is the cash 
m J. Galtung, 'Violence, peace, and peace research': 171. 
376 C. Ake, Democratization of disempowerment in Africa: 3. 











payments and rents that TOCs pay to community members, and finally, government 
inducements to submit arms or sign a peace agreement can spice up the account of 
another organisation that was not included in the peace deal. The low cost of starting an 
army in the Niger Delta is in large part due to the pervasive youth crisis in Nigeria and 
the Niger Delta. Still, opportunity and availability of funding do not equal cause or even 
motivation. 
The best way to guarantee that the basic human needs of the Niger Delta people are met 
is a human rights regime in the region and in the country, or so Odendaal and Amoo 
c1aim.378 Constitutional reform, for example a change or removal of the indigene/settlers 
dichotomy, is one urgent step.379 It is no wonder that nearly all the militia movements 
clamour for a Sovereign National Conference in which the future of the federation, in 
other words the constitution, can be reviewed. Obasanjo has kept this prospective at bay. 
He has no desire to open up possibilities to abolish the Nigerian nation in its present 
form. Osaghae states that: 
'[ .. ] constitutionalism is crucial to salvaging the weak state with regard to creating or enhancing its 
relative autonomy and thereby strengthening its capacity to manage conflict. If [ .. ] constitutional 
law has to do "with the creation, distribution, exercise, legitimational effects and reproduction of 
power," then it is reasonable to expect well-directed constitutional refonn to at least help insulate 
the state from the abuses and excesses that attend lack of autonomy.,380 
Another important aspect of constitutionalism and the possibility of a Sovereign National 
Conference are the opportunities they offer for participation. A system for participation is 
one key outcome of a needs-based process of governance.381 As opposed to the current 
institutions of violence, there is a need for a restructuring of social and political 
institutions. However, the level of participation that people enjoy in 'their' ethnic militia 
movements must not be underestimated. Osaghae reckons that in Africa, ethnicity forms 
the inevitable foundation of civil society structures.382 
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To say that either greed or grievance brought MOSOP, IYC and MEND into being does 
not correspond to the complexity of the situation in the Niger Delta. Moreover, after they 
emerged the militia movements did not remain in a vacuum. Rather they became part of, 
or were bred in the dynamics in the Niger Delta political economy that evolves around 
competition over resources and administrative units, criminal activities such as oil 
bunkering and extortion ofTOCs to obtain redress and privileges. 
Clearly, the emergence of ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta has been a process 
of transformation, rather than a break with and a totally new development from what 
agitation had been there earlier. MOSOP was the product ofOgoni elite minority politics, 
and coupled with the radicalism and the militancy of an angry new generation. The IYC 
came in the wake of MOSOP, and embodied a continuance of the intergenerational 
polarisation that had ushered in MOSOP's fatal divisions. But contrary to MOSOP, the 
IYC did not institutionalise the power of the chiefs. Rather, it was an expression of a 
deliberate disengagement of the youths from their elders. Their social goals were not 
shared, and the IYC even publicly rejected certain agreements that the INC had made 
with the federal government previously on behalf of the Ijaw nation.383 The 
transformation of the Niger Delta struggle after the demise of MOSOP is exemplified by 
the emergence of lYe. While both were shaped as umbrella organisations, for MOSOP 
this fragmentation was an instrument in its continual attempts to connect an elite 
leadership to a grassroots base. For lYC, the fragmentation was not a tool, but inherent in 
its nature. IYC was, and for a large part remains, a truly mass-based, grassroots 
organisation. 
Because its base is fragmented, even literally dispersed between the creeks and the 
swamps of the delta, the IYC organisation must accordingly be heterogeneous, flexible 











and inclusive. This has resulted in the impression that the movements is 'out of control.' 
It may be true, but it is important to recognise that there are many more Ijaws than there 
are Ogoni, and the latter inhabit a small and well-defined territory that is much easier to 
penetrate and consequently to 'tame', because it lacks the mangrove swamps, creeks and 
rivers that make Ijawland so conveniently to be a maze.384 Similarly, it has been argued 
that it is precisely the amorphous structure of the IYC that saved it from the fate that 
befell MOSOP. 
The birth of MEND is even less a process in its own right than the emergence of MOSOP 
and lYe. When MEND manifested itself through its first radical actions in January 2006, 
it was merely a new name that was labelled to groups and operations that had been 
pervading the Niger Delta since the turn of the millennium. True, developments in the 
political environment and the renewed resolve of the federal government to clamp down 
on the insurgency in the Niger Delta, of which the arrest of Dokubo Asari and even the 
incarceration of governor Alamieyeseigha were clear examples, had again made it 
imperative for the movements to become ever more elusive. Even Okonta, who is a 
proponent of MEND, confirms that the movement is 'an idea', a construction that offers 
coherence, or at least the semblance of coherence to 'the slew of communal, civic and 
youth movements that began to proliferate in the Niger Delta, and particularly in the 
Ijaw-speaking areas in the wake of General 8abangida's failed structural adjustment 
policies in the late 1980s.'385 
With MEND, the fragmented structure of the ethnic militia movements has become, after 
the instrumentalism of MOSOP and the inherence of IYC, 'umbrellaism' in its truest 
form. Its function is to incorporate, not to contain or to control. Moreover, its objective is 
not to mobilise or to politicise the issues that afflict its popular base. It is merely to put 
the reigns on, and ride the forces that are already raging within their aggrieved 
communities. Whether these forces are directed toward social and political change or 
whether they are profit-focused does not make a real difference for MEND, as long as the 
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benefits flow in the direction of its nucleus and consequently are sure to advance the 
goals of MEND. And here comes the crux of the matter, which is that the goals of 
MEND, i.e. the objective of the umbrella, are nothing less than social, economic and 
political justice for the Niger Delta people. However practical, realpolitik-driven the 
construction of MEND might be, its lack of a principal ideology - for example, it did not 
issue a Bill of Rights or a Declaration, like MOSOP, lye and so many other movements-
should not be confused with cynicism or worse, war-entrepreneurialism. If there is indeed 
a central leadership of MEND, it is highly unlikely to profit much from what the Niger 
Delta political economy has to offer. Note that this can change, and probably already has 
changed radically within the context of the presidential elections in 2007. But this 
exceeds the matter that is the focus of this study. 
The internal dynamics of MOSOP, with its polarisation of youth vs. elders, radicals vs. 
conservatives and militancy vs. advocacy, has brought to the fore how the rise of the 
youth transformed the struggle of the Niger Delta. The youth 'hijacked' MOSOP, formed 
lye and make up a large part of the slew of movements that are brought together under 
MEND. Other parts of this slew, that have been rudely neglected in this study for lack of 
time and space, but are crucial in the struggle for justice in the Niger Delta, include 
women's movements and other civic, especially environmental organisations. The youth 
movements, including lye have often worked in close collaboration with these and they 
are an integral part of the networks that line the Niger Delta rebellion. Their emergence, 
fortification and radicalisation were equally linked to the ramifications of SAP, economic 
crises, authoritarian government and the revolution against the local gerontocracy. 
Democratisation weakened the powerbase of the traditional ruling class, much as it was 
weakened by the end of colonial rule. Under both the colonial administration and the 
mil itary regime it let itself be co-opted by the powers that be at the expense of those who 
were subjected to their 'native authority': rural youth, women, and indigenes. 
Although democratisation has weakened the power of the chiefs, it has not In tum 
brought about the emancipation of their subjects. What Ake has called a second 











occur through a social transformation taking place within mostly rural communities. The 
rights that are appropriate to communal life: participation, well-being, freedom within the 
limits of the community, rather than as an individual, are more important than elections 
or any of the civil, and political rights that are usually promoted as the pillars of a 
democratisation process, Ake has argued. Political democratisation is meaningless 
without a social revolution that guarantees participation for those who are excluded from 
power within their communities. Economic growth and development are equally 
meaningless without 'a constant referral to the nature of the state and the dynamics of the 
social forces in which it is embedded. ,386 
What does all this mean with regard to the debates around greed versus grievance? The 
aim of this study is to reveal the social, political and economic dynamics that caused 
community leaders, often youths, to organise and fight for either social change or 
financial gain and, in some cases, both. When does a revolt against the social injustice of 
a few elderly men, who keep all benefits derived from TOCs and government patronage 
for themselves, become a struggle for profit? Is it when the disenfranchised, in this case 
the youth, make it their objective to replace these usurpers, instead of just to dethrone 
them? Or is it when they themselves become stakeholders in the political economy that 
forms the original basis of power for the elders and the political elite? How is a group 
able to operate within a system, without becoming part of that system? How can it 
advance its goals, and increase its power -which is just another way of saying that it is 
capable of furthering its objectives- without entering the competition for access to 
resources? According to Reno access to resources is exactly what power constitutes in a 
political economy. These questions will not be answered here, but the evidence shows 
that it would be extremely difficult. 
Collier and Hoeftler attach little value to structural causes like social and political 
grievances that might lead to the escalation of conflict. For their purpose they expect 
more result from a focus on quantifiable factors. This is why, rather than spending much 











time on structural causes, they examine those factors that in their view make rebellion 
viable.387 In this approach motives are less decisive than opportunity in predicting the 
outbreak of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler confuse enabling factors with causes. 
Moreover, the perspective of Collier and Hoeffler on the conflict system of the Niger 
Delta precludes historical context and change. Their system is a simple mechanism, in 
which the different parts drive other parts that will invariably come back to drive the 
same parts. Low costs of raising an army, opportunities to finance a rebellion and, more 
particularly: income per capita; male secondary schooling; growth rate of the economy 
are some of the proxies that in their view support the likeliness of the occurrence of 
conflict and, in this case the emergence of ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta. 
There are two short remarks to be made with regard to these proxies. Firstly, they leave 
no room for a transformation of either the struggle, or of the movements that are said to 
be driven by these proxies. Social dynamics, internal cleavages and polarisation simply 
do not fit within the model that Collier and Hoeffler propose. This is hardly surprising, 
since it is exactly why they have eliminated complicating factors such as historical 
context and social dynamics from their analytical framework in the first place. Yet, they 
are important aspects of the process. The second is that at least one of the proxies appears 
not to be true at all, namely the level of male secondary schooling. As comes forward in 
the study, it is precisely the frustration that came with having obtained high school 
diplomas and university degrees and yet not being able to find employment that 
intensified the crisis of youth in the wake of SAP, economic decline and social 
marginalisation. Other factors, such as the privatisation of security, ethnic exclusion, the 
collapse of state legitimacy and government centralism may belinked to some of the 
proxies of Collier and Hoeffler. So, the privatisation of security, which was a direct 
consequence of the end of military rule and its state-fostered security alliances - at least 
formally, since, with the continuing militarization of the Niger Delta it can be argued that 
the state continues to provide security for the TOCs with deployment of the army, navy 
and police - can be seen as enhancing the low cost of raising a rebel army. But in no 
manner does this explain how the emergence of the ethnic militia movements has been 











caused by the privatisation of security, nor how the privatisation of security itself was 
brought about. More importantly, it fails to reveal anything about the dynamics that are 
affected by the privatisation of security and the effects that this mutation of the conflict 
system may have with regard to the youth, the state and the Niger Delta political 
economy. Other factors that have contributed to the transformation of the youth resistance 
are the military pacification tactics and the intensification of community development 
projects. 
Burton's perspective of basic human needs leaves more room for the 'transformation 
argument', which includes the growing opposition against not only the federal state and 
TOCs, but also the traditional and the local political elites who continue to accumulate 
wealth, while excluding youth, women and settlers from access to economic and social 
resources. Although earlier generations of agitators for oil-minorities' rights might have 
suffered from at least relative deprivation of their basic human needs, and they obviously 
had economic incentives that correspond to Collier and Hoeffier's greed proxies, it was 
this deprivation aggravated by the combined forces of SAP, economic CrISIS, 
gerontocratic and neo-patromonial exclusivist rule that made the ethnic militia 
movements emerge in the form in which they did. This aggravated deprivation on top of 
the original marginalisation of the oil-minorities and the state-oil alliance's violation of 
human rights is what caused the youths of the Niger Delta to rise, engage in the conflict 
system of the Niger Delta, and transform it socially, politically and economically by 
doing so. 
The significant differences between MOSOP, IYC and MEND demonstrate the dynamic 
nature of the system in which they emerged. The proxies, as described by Collier and 
Hoeffier, as far as they were ever relevant, have not changed much between the rise of 
MOSOP and the manifestation of MEND. The changes in the social dynamics and the 
political and economic context informing these dynamics are related to the basic human 
needs described by Burton and, in particular those linked to the need for participation and 











But the basic human needs perspective of Burton has little explanatory value with regard 
to the emergence of ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta without bringing in the 
contextual element of Galtung's structural violence. Only when it is understood that the 
exclusion and denial of basic human needs like participation, well-being and freedom is a 
case of structural violence, inflicted by the gerontocracy of traditional rulers on its youth, 
women and other marginalised, does its full impact and meaning become clear. The 
structural violence of the traditional elite is enmeshed in the structural violence of the 
state and the TOes. Unequal distribution of power is what propels the emergence of 
ethnic militia movements in the Niger Delta. In the political economy of the Niger Delta 
the pursuit of rights and especially the right of self-determination is a direct claim to the 
power structures that determine the distribution of oil revenue. But the struggles that 
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